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This thesis will examine the emerging role of a sub-regional organization dealing 
with peacekeeping and peacemaking missions on the post-Cold-War period in West 
Africa. This examination will focus mainly on ECOWAS and ECOMOG, its military 
wing, as the most prominent sub-regional organization in conducting peacemaking and 
peacekeeping missions in Africa. This thesis will focus on the first generation 
interventions of ECOWAS/ECOMOG in undertaking peacemaking and peacekeeping 
missions in Liberia (1990 – 1997), Sierra Leone, (1998 – 2000), and Guinea Bissau (1998 
– 1999)), and the second generation of interventions in Liberia in 2003 and in Côte 
d`Ivoire (2003-2004). This examination aimed at assessing ECOWAS’ strengths and 
limitations and comparing to which the second generation interventions have benefited 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
According to the United Nations (UN) Charter, the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security rests with the UN Security Council.1 
However, the role and the scope of UN peacemaking and peacekeeping missions have 
changed over the last fifty years, in response to the changing nature of conflicts, and the 
rising role of other regional organizations.  
During the Cold War, competition between the two superpowers (i.e., the United 
States and the U.S.S.R.) and “the impossibility for the permanent members of the 
Security Council to agree on joint action”2 were the primary influences on UN policy. 
During this period, major changes in the international and regional political arenas altered 
the way the world perceived peace and security. One change that captured international 
attention as the Cold War ended was the increase in the number of intra-state conflicts.3  
The UN and the international community played only a passive role in stopping 
the recurrence of internal conflicts in Africa, and helping to reduce the violence prevalent 
in many West African countries. The perceived inadequacy of their combined response, 
however, prompted sub-regional organizations, such as the Economic Community of the 
West African States (ECOWAS), to intervene in many countries to halt the fighting 
between various factions and attempt to reach a peaceful resolution to these conflicts.   
This thesis will provide an initial assessment of sub regional peacekeeping in 
West Africa.  After reviewing the evolution of UN peacekeeping and peacemaking 
missions in Africa during the Cold War era and post-Cold-War periods in Chapter II, 
Chapter III will analyze ECOWAS’ first three interventions, in Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Guinea-Bissau, setting out it achievements and shortcomings. Through an analysis of  
 
1 Chapter V of The United Nations Charter: Charter of the United Nations signed at San Francisco on 
26 June 1945. Entry into force 24 October 1945<,http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/> (22 February 2005). 
2 Maria Bideke :the future of the UN peacekeeping , 
<http:// justint.org/the %20future/%20for%20un%20peacekeeping.html> (20 February 2005). 
3 Abiodun Alao The role of African regional and sub regional organizations in conflict prevention and 
resolution. < http://www.jha.ac/articles/u023.html>(20 February 2005). 
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more recent interventions in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, Chapter IV assesses the extent to 
which ECOWAS has benefited from lessons learned during the first generation of 
interventions.  
There is no doubt that the UN peacekeeping role in Africa has changed over the 
last four decades. During the Cold War era, efforts towards peacekeeping were often 
marred by political competition between the United States and the Soviet Union due to 
their support of their respective allies in the region. These two superpowers were 
generally opposed to UN involvement in the domestic affairs of their respective allies and 
client states, being more concerned with maintaining the integrity of their own spheres of 
influence.4 The spread of their respective ideologies and the preservation of their national 
interests influenced the way the UN perceived peacemaking and peacekeeping operations 
in conflicts throughout the world. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were 
reluctant to support any UN initiatives unless their national interests were satisfied.  As a 
result, only one UN peacekeeping operation (Congo 1960-1964) took place in Africa 
before 1989.  
Despite the particular influences of the two superpowers during the Cold War, the 
UN tried to act independently in managing regional conflicts. In some cases, the UN 
became heavily dependant on the willingness and commitment of the United States and 
the Soviet Union to participate in the settlement of such conflicts. In other cases, the 
rivalry between the two superpowers prevented the Security Council from taking any 
urgent and concrete actions.  
After the Cold War, the recrudescence of intra-state conflicts became a crucial 
problem for regional security. The withdrawal of the two superpowers from Africa had a 
destabilizing role on many countries. Such countries received, over the period of the Cold 
War, military and financial support to sustain their regimes. Therefore the shrinkage of 
external support, in addition to other domestic problems, contributed to the degradation 
of social, economic and security in many countries, which resulted in internal strives and 
conflicts.  
 
4 Roland Paris: At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 15. 
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The eruption of many civil wars created a huge burden on the UN and the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) to prevent and solve these conflicts. Neither the 
UN nor the OAU were able to intervene in a timely manner in order to secure peace and 
lessen the impacts of civil wars. The delay of response led to the emergence of sub-
regional organizations as an alternative to enhance regional peacemaking and 
peacekeeping capabilities and ensure peace and stability. 
In West Africa, ECOWAS emerged as a new actor in dealing with security issues 
on the regional level. Previously ECOWAS has been devoted entirely to economic 
development. Consequently, ECOWAS attempted to play a more significant role in 
peacemaking and peacekeeping missions, first in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-
Bissau, then in Côte d’ Ivoire and again a second effort in Liberia. ECOWAS underwent 
various transformations over the intervening years in an effort to improve its 
effectiveness in meeting the needs of securing peace and stability in the sub-region. 
The most significant non-UN expanded peacekeeping operations were 
conducted by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. Known as the 
Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG), these missions attempted to restore order in countries 
divided by civil war.5
The ECOMOG was instrumental in conducting peacemaking and peacekeeping 
missions in Liberia (1990 – 1997), Sierra Leone (1998 – 2000), and Guinea-Bissau (1998 
– 1999).  These interventions, the first ones of this kind in Africa, were implemented in 
an environment of inexperience, insufficient financial and logistical support, rampant 
regional and political divisions, and lack of external support. They were carried out in an 
ad-hoc manner, in the absence of a security framework mechanism or an organizational 
structure to achieve such complex missions.  Although ECOWAS and ECOMOG had 
many successes, they also experienced some setbacks.  
In response to these setbacks, ECOWAS initiated several changes to improve the 
effectiveness of its organizational structure in dealing with regional security issues, 
thereby making it a more permanent structure.  In the development of chapter IV, recent 
 
5  Fredeick H.Fleitz: Peacekeeping Fiascos of the 1990’s (Westport CT, Praeger Publishers, 2004), 
111.  
4 
interventions of ECOMOG will be examined; in Liberia in 2003 (and for a shorter period 
of time in Liberia at a later period), and in Cote d`Ivoire (2003-2004). The interventions 
in Liberia  and Côte d'Ivoire , therefore were instituted under changed circumstances. The 
UN also became more involved in these internal conflicts, regional-political divisions 
lessened, and the international community was more cooperative in supporting West 
African initiatives in peace operations. 
During fifteen years of active interventions, ECOWAS has experienced several 
transformations, all of which have served to enhance its role as a sub-regional 
organization dealing with peace operations. This organization has demonstrated a 
growing interest in managing regional crises, despite its limited financial and logistical 
means, as well as the serious challenges it faces in the field. Thus, exploring the strengths 
and limitations of ECOWAS as a pioneering regional organization in peacekeeping and 
peacemaking, this thesis will help better define ECOWAS’ role in ensuring peace and 
stability. This analysis endeavors to a fuller understanding of ECOWAS strengths and 
limitations as a means of improving future ECOWAS interventions in order to 1) 
reinforce its standing in both the UN and the international community, and 2) ensure that 
ECOWAS will help relieve the UN from heavy responsibilities in this turbulent region.  
During the Cold War, the United Nations peacekeeping missions aimed at 
pacifying inter-state conflicts through the deployment of unarmed or lightly armed 
military personnel from different countries serving under the UN flag. The purpose of the 
deployment of forces was both to help separate the belligerent parties and to prepare the 
conditions eventual peaceful settlements of conflicts. In the post Cold War period, the 
UN has continued its efforts to preserve peace and security, now mostly in the context of 
intra-state conflicts. 
Moreover, the recrudescence of civil wars in Africa in short period of time, 
prevented the UN from responding to all emerging conflicts in a timely manner. As a 
result of the proliferation of these internal conflicts and the inability of the UN to react 
quickly to prevent the widespread of violence, three sub-regional organizations have 
emerged in order to face the challenges of security issues in their respective sub-regions. 
“ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD have engaged in conflict resolution with varying degrees 
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of success”6. In West Africa, for example, ECOWAS has become the most notable in 
dealing with regional civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte 
d’Ivoire. The SADC contributed to the management of conflict in Lesotho and mediated 
in internal conflict in Congo; while the IGAD was particularly involved in the mediation 
of conflict in Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan7 . 
The first UN peacekeeping operation in Africa took place in the Republic of 
Congo from July 1960 to June 1964, following Belgian military intervention and the 
breakout of fighting between different Congolese factions over power.. With nearly 
20,000 UN peacekeepers, the operation was mandated to provide the newly independent 
country with military and technical assistance to restore law and order. As proof of its 
commitment to resolving the Congo crisis, in the face of increasing superpower 
involvement, the UN played an active leadership role in the implementation of 
peacekeeping operations. Because this country was considered a major battleground 
between the two superpowers in the spread of their ideologies, as well as in the 
preservation of their interests in the region, the UN’s firm stance and daring decisions 
preempted direct military intervention by the US and the Soviet Union in the Congo. It 
was in this context that Harlan Cleveland, then US Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Organization Affairs, stated that: “because of the UN’s Congo operation, 
there were no uninvited foreign troops, no communist enclaves, no army of liberation, 
and no reason for single American soldier to die there, no excuse for a Soviet soldier to 
live there.”8
Although the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. disengaged from Africa, in theory freeing the 
UN to take action there, the many civil wars in West Africa were too much for the UN to 
handle. With the end of the Cold War, and the eruption of civil wars, the scope of the UN 
peacekeeping missions increased, and the nature of its peacekeeping efforts changing 
accordingly. A second major change in the post Cold War era is that the UN  
6 Jeremy Levitt.Conflict:Prevention, Management and Resolution: African Regional Strategies for the 
Prevention of Displacement and Protection of Displaced Persons. The cases of the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, 
and IGAD. <http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/djcil/articles/djcil11p39.htm> (9 March 2005). 
7 William Zartman:Regional conflict management  in Africa, in Regional conflict management  Paul F 
Diehl and Joseph Lepgold(Maryland,Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 85. 
8 William J.Durch: The evolution of UN peacekeeping. (New York, the Henry L.Stimson Center 1993), 
345.  
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peacekeeping operations expanded beyond the traditional peacekeeping tasks into 
multidimensional operations, involving political and humanitarian work, such as the 
supervising of elections, peace building, civil administration, verification of human rights 
practice s, reconstruction of infrastructures, delivery of humanitarian relief, and nation 
building.9  
Also, the post Cold War period saw the increase of internal strife in many 
locations in Africa, which request an increase of peacekeeping missions to prevent the 
spread of violence. Despite the limited means of the UN, coupled with a lack of interest 
on the part of the international community to get involved, this organization strived to 
respond to the increase demand in peacekeeping missions. Subsequently, the above 
factors contributed largely to an increase in the number and size of UN missions in 
Africa. In turn, this expansion of the UN role created a heavy burden on its operations 
and its ability to deal efficiently with increasingly complex security situations and in 
timely manner. Accordingly during this period the UN was facing the world’s most 
intractable conflicts, without the necessary financial and logistical support from the 
international community to resolve them.10 
A critical issue that arose in this period was the questionable legality of UN 
intervention in internal conflicts. The UN was clearly limited by its principle of the 
“inviolability of (national) sovereignty.” This principle of “non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of a sovereign state”11 constituted an impediment to UN interventions. 
“The sanctity of principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in other states' 
affairs throughout the Cold War era largely confined the UN to intervention in wars 
between countries”12. Consequently, the delay to intervene in certain internal conflicts 
triggered an increase in violence, often generating atrocities and mass carnage. The  
 
9 David Malone and Karin Wermester:The Changing Nature of UN Peacekeeping. Managing Armed 
Conflicts in the 21 Century .Adekeye Adebajo and Chadra l.Siram, (London, Frank Case Publisher 2001), 
39. 
10 Fredeick H.Fleitz, Peacekeeping Fiascos of the 1990’s (Westport CT,Praeger Publishers,2004), 16. 
11 United Nations Charter: Chapter II.<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm > (10 
March 2005). 
12 United Nations Peacekeeping, <http//: www.una-uk.org/UN&C/Peacekeeping.html> (4 July 2004). 
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abandonment of Somalia in worst situation, the negligence of critical situation in 
Rwanda, and the decline of intervention in Liberia, constituted the most notable fiascos 
of the UN in dealing with this kind of internal conflicts. 
The UN undertook reforms aimed at improving its capacity to conduct 
peacekeeping operations in the context of any complex crisis.  In this context, the 
Brahimi report of August 17, 2000, submitted to the Secretary General of the UN, offered 
a critical and useful assessment of the UN’s past peacekeeping operations, and extensive 
recommendations about how the UN could improve its performance in conflict 
prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace building, in order to meet 
the challenges of peacekeeping in the 21st Century. Among its recommendations was    
the empowerment of regional and sub-regional organizations in Africa to undertake 
regional peacekeeping operations, and the strengthening of UN cooperation with those 
organizations in peacekeeping and in enhancing the capacities of these organizations.13  
African sub-regional organizations thus emerged by necessity as managers of 
regional conflicts. Over the last fifteen years, the contributions of African sub-regional 
organizations to peacemaking, particularly ECOWAS in peacekeeping, have highlighted 
the importance of regional arrangements in successfully addressing regional problems. In 
their responses to the havoc caused by the spillover effects of civil wars in neighboring 
countries, African sub-regional organizations have attempted to develop their own 
peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities.  The Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), all previously devoted to the 
economic development of their respective regions, have each undergone to some degrees 
significant transformations to address the needs for preserving peace and stability. 
ECOWAS is the most active sub-regional organization dealing with security 
issues in Africa. It is made up of fifteen-member states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape 
Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. This organization has been involved in 
peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts in several countries through its military body, the 
 
13 Ibrahimi report. Report of the Panel on the United Nations peace operations 
<http:www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/>. (20 December 2004). 
8 
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). 
ECOMOG was created in 1990 as an ad hoc response to emerging needs, then being 
deployed as a peacekeeping force in West Africa. It was set up by member states in order 
to deal with security problems that followed the collapse of the formal state structures in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau. An assessment of the ECOMOG's 
interventions in Liberia (1990 –1997), in Guinea-Bissau (1998 – 1999), in Sierra Leone 
(1998 – 2000), and the ongoing interventions in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire will be the 
focus of the next two chapters. 
 

















II. ECOWAS: IN LIBERIA, SIERRA LEONE AND GUINEA-
BISSAU 
A. INTRODUCTION 
ECOWAS’ military interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau all 
attempted to end civil wars. These were ambitious attempts to address internal conflicts 
without the support of the UN or the international community. Despite the financial 
constraints experienced by most member states, and the absence of existing security 
frameworks at the regional level, ECOWAS intervened with its own resources and 
means. In order to better understand and accurately assess ECOMOG’s interventions, one 
must reflect on the recent history of the countries concerned, and examine the political 
and security situations prevailing at the time in the region. 
Since the early 1960’s, most West African countries have experienced crises of 
varying degrees and intensities. During the 1980’s, the regional security situation steadily 
deteriorated in many West African countries, and these countries became some of the 
most volatile and unstable in the world. The combination of colonial legacies, bad 
governance, and the degradation of the economic, political and social led to unrest and 
fighting in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. As a consequence of their 
geographic proximity and the commonality of their political and social features, security 
issues in these countries were closely linked. Civil wars jumped from one country to 
another in a relatively short period of time. In fact, the occurrence of civil war in one 
country has inevitably had a destabilizing affect on neighboring countries, and the whole 
sub-region. For that reason, ECOMOG’s interventions aimed as much at preventing 
regional violence and instability as at resolving internal conflicts. 
The civil war in Liberia had its roots in the early days of the country’s creation      
in 1847. Despite their minority status, the Americo-Liberians dominated the country’s 
political, economical and social domains for more than 130 years. For many decades 
prior to the crisis, they ruled the country inefficiently. The growing incompetence of 
successive governments, and discriminatory practices toward the majority indigenous 
population led to riots and internal strife. Ultimately, on April 12, 1980, Samuel Doe 
seized power in a military coup d’etat. 
10 
                                                
The Doe regime set out to kill former president William Tolbert, and members of 
his entourage, all the while marginalizing other key figures of the former administration. 
The junta established a repressive military regime in Liberia based around the new 
president’s ethnic group, the Krahns. This perpetuated the ethnic divisions within the 
national institutions, including the bureaucracy. During the first five years of his rule, 
Doe did not succeed in implementing the economic, social and political reforms he had 
promised at the time he seized power in Liberia. On the contrary, he transformed his 
regime into a civilian entity and, in the absence of any effective opposition, held elections 
that were far from free and fair14. In order to remain in power, the new regime drew 
internal support from the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), and external support from 
Nigeria and the USA, as a Cold War ally. This tumultuous situation lasted until 1989, 
when armed opposition arose to challenge Doe’s regime15. This rebellion was led by 
Charles Taylor, head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). During the 
struggle over power between the Doe regime and the NPFL rebels, Liberia plunged into 
bloodshed and armed conflict. This eruption of violence marked the start of a long, 
bloody civil war in Liberia. 
The conflict in Sierra Leone followed essentially the same pattern. From 
independence in 1961, a minority of the population (descendants from freed slaves), ruled 
and dominated political and economic life in Sierra Leone. However, the cumulative 
impact of mismanagement by successive administrations led to the degradation of state 
institutions, the fragmentation of Sierra Leonean society, and the decline of the economic 
system. Those circumstances were the main driving forces behind the widespread 
violence and hostilities in the country. Consequently, in March 1991 the country 
witnessed the eruption of an insurgency in the form of the Revolutionary United Front  
 
14 Adekeye Adebajo:Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa (London, Lynne 
Riennier Publishers, 2002), 28. 
15 Clement Adib.The Liberian conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partenership.Third World Quarterly, 
Vol 18, No3, pp471-488, 1997. 
11 
                                                
(RUF). The rebels of the RUF movement was made up of Sierra Leonean fighters and 
Liberian elements from the NPFL, who had had received military training in guerrilla 
warfare in Libya and Burkina Faso16. 
The RUF, led by Foday Sankoh, instigated a rebellion against the government of 
Joseph Momoh; the leader of this movement motivated more by the plunder of natural 
resources (mainly lucrative diamond mining) than by the achievement of any political 
ambitions. Because of the collapse of the state’s institutions, the central government had 
little control over its territory, failing to prevent the rebels from capturing more territory, 
particularly rich zones where the diamond mines were located.  
The security situation in Sierra Leone worsened when the elected government of 
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was ousted in May 25, 1997, by a coup d’etat mounted by a group 
of army officers, led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma. Ironically, the leader of this junta 
appointed himself as Chairman of the new Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC), allying himself with the rebels of the RUF in governing the country. As the 
opponents to this new regime increased, the security situation deteriorated even more 
rapidly as the country entered an uncertain climate of violence and criminality.  
The first civil war in Liberia had a destabilizing influence on Sierra Leone, as 
well as on other neighboring countries. The relationship between the two warlords, 
Charles Taylor, leader of the NPFL, and Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, instigators of 
civil wars in their respective countries, goes back to the earliest days of their rebellions. 
 The relationship between Taylor and Sankoh strengthened during the years of 
civil war in the two countries.  RUF and NPFL rebels moved back and forth across the 
border of Liberia and Sierra Leone freely, complicating and delaying the resolution of 
this regional conflict. To support their rebellions, the two movements established an 
alliance based on the criminal exploitation of natural resources and weapons smuggling. 
After his election as president, Taylor became officially involved in the illegal trade of 
diamonds and arms, with the RUF rebels and continued to inter-meddle in Sierra  
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Leonean state affairs. The alliance between the RUF and the president of Liberia fueled 
the civil war in Sierra Leone by providing the rebels with arms in exchange for 
diamonds17. 
The involvement and interference of Charles Taylor in the Sierra Leonean civil 
war was motivated, firstly, to plunder the diamonds extracted from Sierra Leone in order 
to sustain the purchase of weapons; secondly, to divert ECOMOG from its efforts to 
prevent his assumption of power in Liberia; and finally, to create problems for the Sierra 
Leonean government in response to its prominent role in supporting ECOMOG in 
Liberia. 
The conflict in Guinea Bissau followed a different pattern. The crisis there started 
in June of 1998, following the attempted military coup d état led by General Ansumane 
Mane. After Mane failed to overthrow the democratically elected president, Joao 
Bernardo Veira, the situation degenerated into a mutiny against the central government. 
Despite the efforts of military forces loyal to the government, and the intervention of 
Senegalese and Guinean troops sent to prevent the conflict from spilling over into their 
countries, the rebellion spread throughout Guinea-Bissau. Violent battles took place 
between the two camps, particularly in the capital, and thousands of civilians were caught 
in the crossfire before fleeing to the countryside and neighboring countries.  
B. ECOMOG INTERVENTIONS IN LIBERIA, AND SIERRA LEONE AND 
GUINEA-BISSAU   
1. ECOMOG Organization Shortcomings 
a. Institutional Structures 
Originally formed as an economic community in 1975, ECOWAS was 
intended to promote economic cooperation between member states. The authority vested 
in ECOWAS by member states provided it with the necessary institutions to fulfill its 
goal as a regional economic organization in West Africa.18 At the advent of the Liberian 
crisis ECOWAS attempted to move quickly from dealing with economic to security 
 
17 Confort Ero and A, Ndinga-Muvumba, “Small Arms, Light Weapons”, in Adekeye Adebajo and 
Ismail Rashid, West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region (London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2004), 231. 
18 Economic Community of West African States Charter , 
<http:// www.sec.ecowas.int/sitecedeao/english/ap101299.htm> (20 January 2005). 
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matters, on the premise that security was a critical factor in any regional economic 
development. But it had no preparation for this task.  From its inception until the creation 
of ECOMOG in 1990, ECOWAS had been unable to reach a regional consensus on the 
establishment of an institutionalized sub-regional organ for security issues and conflict 
management. Moreover, its charter lacked the legal prerogative permitting it to intervene 
in the internal affairs of member states. For that reason, ECOWAS’ decision to deploy 
armed forces in Liberia's internal conflict was considered   by the francophone member 
states as violation of its organizational charter and, thus, an illegal extension of the 
mandate of ECOWAS. Therefore not all of the states in the sub-region supported 
ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, and the Anglophone that did were experiencing 
political, economic and social difficulties at home, thus making the financial support of 
the ECOMOG difficult to sustain. 
Prior to the creation of ECOMOG, there was no special institution within 
the ECOWAS organization to financially support actions related to security. Moreover, 
because of the failure of member states to pay their contributions on a regular basis, the 
organization suffered from a lack of sufficient funding even to sustain its normal 
activities. With no institutional structures in place, ECOWAS improvised a shaky and 
confused series of ad hoc structure to deal with security issues, including the Standing 
Mediation Committee (SMC), the ECOMOG, the Special Emergency Fund, and later the 
Committees of Five, and Nine.19  At its inception, the SMC was composed mainly of the 
Anglophone countries: Ghana, Gambia, Mali, Nigeria and Togo. It was only later 
assigned the mission to mediate the Liberian conflict and, later still, to address the other 
security issues in the region. Over time, the SMC became the only institution within 
ECOWAS to monitor the implementation of ECOWAS peace processes and, thus, played 
an active role in managing the deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia. The two Committees 
of Five and Nine were established after the deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia. “The 
Committee of Five became an important instrument of mediation between the various  
 
19 Klaas Van Walraven:Containing conflict in ECONOMIC Community of West African States: 
Lessons from the intervention in Liberia 1990-1997.< http://www.clingendael.nl/cru/pdf/ecomog.pdf>  (10 
March 2005). 
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Liberian factions, for some time wresting the intervention initiative from the 
Nigerians.”20 This occurred while the Committee of Nine oversaw the implementation of 
the ECOWAS peace process and acted as a liaison with the UN.  
In this context, special representative of ECOWAS in Liberia were 
entrusted with all administrative and financial tasks, while the command of the forces on 
the ground was assigned to the Force Commander. To give more credibility to the 
improvised structure of ECOMOG, while also temporarily lessening the dominant role of 
Nigeria, the SMC decided that the command of forces would be established in such a way 
that the contributing countries could play a more salient role. For that reason, the Force 
Commander’s role was entrusted to Ghana, the deputy force commander’s role to Guinea, 
and the chief of staff’s role to Nigeria.  The SMC stipulated that “the commander was to 
have full command authority over ECOMOG, which he would derive from the chairman 
of the ECOWAS Authority through the Executive Secretary.”21 
Unfortunately, dissension among the member states of ECOWAS as to the 
appropriate role of various organs within the structure contributed to most shortcoming 
and difficulties related to the management of ECOMOG. “Moreover, the political and 
legal advisory positions in ECOMOG were not filled due to financial difficulties. As a 
result, the ECOMOG Force Commander was often called upon to perform a political as 
well as a military role.”22  Thus deficiencies at the structural level often exacerbated the 
dominance within ECOMOG of a single country. According to Berman and Sams, 
“capitalizing on the lack of a functioning security framework, Nigeria pushed through the 
creation of an entirely new structure-one that would better serve its purposes, the 
Authority’s decision to establish the SMC with a very broad mandate, and to make 
Nigeria a member of that body provided Lagos with an opportunity to influence 
ECOWAS policy on Liberia, which Nigeria fully exploited.”23 The hasty creation of the 
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21 Ibid. 
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United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000) ,107 
23 Ibid. 89. 
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ad hoc structures, such Committee of Five and Special Emergency Fund, prevented 
ECOMOG from functioning effectively. As a result, the SMC, acting under the influence 
of Nigeria, continued to be the sole authority supervising ECOMOG’s deployment in 
Liberia. 
Acting as an improvisational force, ECOMOG landed in Monrovia, 
Liberia, on August 24, 1990 without any visible structure. This lasted throughout the 
Liberian intervention, and continued into the ones in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. 
Under these circumstances, ECOMOG became subject to abuse and manipulation by 
some of its member states. “The ECOMOG forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone were 
dominated by Nigeria, resulting in a lack of sub regional unity and depriving the force of 
important legitimacy in fulfilling its tasks,”24while “the ECOMOG mission in Guinea 
Bissau, under a Togolese commander, reported directly to Togolese leader Gnassingbe 
Eyadema, the ECOWAS chairman.”25 
b. Regional Security Framework 
At the time of its intervention in the Liberian civil war, ECOWAS lacked 
any permanent security framework to be implemented in cases of internal conflict. This 
lack of a regional standing security framework equipped to deal with peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement missions was a significant weakness. Moreover, the ECOWAS charter 
did not embrace any clear provisions dealing with security matters. The two previous 
protocols adopted by ECOWAS were not operational, lacked provisions for the 
prevention of conflict, and did not empower the organization to intervene in internal 
conflicts in this region: 
1. The protocol of Non-Aggression, adopted and signed in Lagos on 
April 22, 1978 mandated to ECOWAS member states not to use 





24  Adekeye ,A., 147 
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26 The protocol of Non-Aggression of ECOWAS, < http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/ 
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2. The Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense, adopted and 
signed in Freetown, on May 29, 1981, stipulated, among other 
important propositions, that each state provide aid and assistance in 
cases where other states were subject to threat or aggression.  
However, in spite of these provisions, when ECOMOG was created, it had 
no structural organization, no reliable budget earmarked for its missions, and no ready-
trained forces to be deployed on the ground. The composition and structure of forces 
were hastily improvised to respond to the Liberian crisis. To anticipate the generation of 
forces, member states of SMC, plus Sierra Leone and Guinea, committed the first 
contingents of ECOMOG. Meanwhile the ECOWAS Authority explicitly appealed to 
other member states to contribute contingents in the course of intervention to participate 
in the force’s operation27.  
After being deployed in Liberia seven years on an ad hoc basis, ECOMOG 
continued to be deployed in the same manner in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. Years 
after the creation of ECOMOG, ECOWAS had failed to learn from the Liberian 
experience. Thus, it failed to establish a standing security framework with the necessary 
structure for the task at hand, thereby denying ECOMOG the needed capabilities to 
sustain the other two missions more efficiently.   
c. Operational Problems 
ECOMOG’s efficiency as a regional peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
force can be assessed based on its operational performance, including the following 
elements: its ability to monitor ceasefires; in its ability to deal impartially with all parties 
in a conflict; its propensity to decrease violence; and in its ability to ensure a favorable 
environment for political resolution of the three civil wars.  
Initially, ECOMOG entered Liberia for a traditional peacekeeping 
mission, i.e., to monitor the ceasefire between fighting factions. However, as ECOMOG 
forces landed in Monrovia, they were attacked by the NPFL, who then controlled almost 
all of the country outside the capital city. This rapid and unexpected degradation of the  
 
27Klaas van Walraven: The pretence of Peace-keeping ECOMOG, West Africa and Liberia (1990-
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security situation led ECOMOG to shift its mission to that of peace enforcement. 
However, this was beyond its means at the time, due primarily to the lacks of having 
sufficient troops on the ground and enough expertise.  
The situation grew worse when President Doe was captured by the 
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) in ECOMOG headquarters, 
before the eyes of the Force Commander.  Soon thereafter, ECOMOG allied itself with 
the INPFL and the AFL to repulse NPFL forces and create a buffer zone around the 
capital. These two events demonstrated ECOMOG’s inability to deal with the fighting 
factions in a neutral manner. As ECOMOG was drawn deeper into the Liberian conflict 
its inability to carry out such a mission without the external support of the UN and the 
international community became apparent. Many operational problems emerged.  
The command and control of forces was perhaps the most intractable 
problem for ECOMOG in Liberia. ECOMOG’s command structure was organized in 
such a manner as to accommodate the interests of all contributing countries. All forces 
were formally under the authority of the Forces Commander, but each country’s troops 
were commanded by its Contingent Commander. Each Contingent Commander also 
served as Deputy Force Commander in his sector. The Force Commander was the sole 
authority, designating the sectors of the mission area to the respective contingents. But 
within this structure, each country’s contingent maintained its own command structure. 
Thus, ECOMOG forces had two chains of command: 1) the force commander and 2) the 
troop commands from contributing countries. This situation caused enormous operational 
difficulties. Usually, the contingent commander could not make decisions, or take part in 
combat or offensive operations, without the approval of his home government. This 
meant that before any tactical decision could be implemented by ECOMOG, each 
contingent commander had to consult his own government, thereby delaying the 
implementation of missions, and reducing their effectiveness on the ground. Because of 
the high level of control by home governments, the contingent commanders enjoyed 
considerable autonomy from the control of force commander, often resulting in 
disciplinary problems and jeopardizing ECOMOG's act as a unified force.28 
 
28 Mitikishe Maxwell Khobe: The evolution and control of ECOMOG operations in West Africa, 
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The troops from contributing countries often served under vastly different 
conditions, and these incongruities were evident to all. There were often discrepancies in 
the quality of supplies, wages, and personal equipment, which frequently caused some 
peacekeeping troops to behave badly. In this context, military professionalism is vital 
when peacekeepers operate in heavily populated environments; in their peace 
enforcement mission, ECOMOG forces were in continual interactions with civilian 
populations29.Unfortunately, the lack of professionalism led to the misconduct of 
peacekeepers; accordingly alleged misconducts had been reported, the type crimes 
allegedly  committed were, abuse, rape; looting; theft and other criminal activities, 
thereby compromising ECOMOG’s credibility during its deployment  in Liberia. 
Prior to deployment in Liberia, the contributing countries had never had a 
joint exercise as a single, cohesive force. The diversity of languages, equipment, and 
doctrine denied the ECOMOG force the synchronicity and homogeneity that a military 
operation requires to be successful on the ground.  There were communications 
difficulties between Francophone and Anglophone forces, and an overall lack training in 
counterinsurgency. As result, some contingents demonstrated incompetence and lack of 
motivation (and esprit de corps) in fighting rebel factions. This lack of professionalism 
made a decisive defeat of the rebels impossible.  
ECOMOG suffered from similar operational problems in Sierra Leone in 
1998.  Despite its initial success in removing the junta from power and restoring the 
elected government in Freetown, rebellion continued in the hinterland. In the framework 
of its peace enforcement mission, and in an attempt to secure the rest of the country, 
ECOMOG engaged in attacks against the AFRC and the RUF.  Despite the deployment 
of thousands of troops “ECOMOG's ill-equipped peacekeepers were unable to defeat the 
AFRC/RUF alliance in a guerilla war in the densely forested countryside for which their 
conventional armies were not trained.”30 Eventually the rebels pushed ECOMOG forces 
back to Freetown, and a battle for control of the capital ensued. 
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During the 6 January 1999 rebel invasion of Freetown, Nigerian jets 
bombed rebels’ positions in the capital and its soldiers shelled the outskirts 
of eastern Freetown.  ECOMOG eventually forced the rebels to withdraw 
from Freetown after more than six weeks with the loss of 3,000 civilian 
lives and massive destruction of the city by arsonist rebels. About 100 
Nigerian soldiers died in this attack and 100 were missing in action.31.  
As a result of this incident, ECOMOG revised its strategy and began 
deploying its forces in strategic locations throughout Sierra Leone, previously having 
been mainly stationed around Freetown, to prevent surprise attacks by the RUF.  
ECOMOG again proved to be inadequately prepared to face the challenges of peace 
enforcement, as operational problems became more complicated. Command and control 
of forces was again a major problem, which undermined its cohesion. “Because of the 
high level of distrust among member states, contingents usually arrived in the mission 
area with different and sometimes conflicting instructions”32 
Nigerian dominance also created problems at the level of command and 
control of forces, as it had in Liberia. Nigeria again provided the bulk of the forces, the 
Force Commander, and the majority of financial and logistical support, and this lack of 
balance within ECOMOG led to the unilateral manipulation of forces by Nigeria. 
Contributing countries were usually not consulted about important decisions regarding 
ECOMOG’s mission in Sierra Leone.  In retaliation for this practice, contingents of 
contributing countries would frequently criticize Nigerian unilateral management of 
forces and decisions. ECOMOG’s national contingents did work together at an 
operational level, and troop contributing countries did not even coordinate their 
actions33.As in Liberia, each contingent had to consult with its own government before  
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acting. , Nigerian domination again undermined ECOMOG cohesion and unity to the 
point that “some contingents ... at times refused to come to the aid of other contingents 
without clearance from their home governments.”34 
On the tactical level as well, ECOMOG failed to apply the lessons of 
Liberia to Sierra Leone.  The inexperience of ECOMOG forces was exacerbated in this 
case by inadequate knowledge of the forest terrain, and incapacity to counter the guerrilla 
tactics employed so efficiently by the RUF.35  Some contingents lacked motivation to 
engage in vigorous combat against the rebels, and insufficient allowances, low wages, 
and long periods of deployment led to low morale.  Disciplinary problems related to poor 
living conditions were again in evidence. A significant number of officers were 
reportedly involved in the illicit diamond trade for personal profit.36  Also similar to the 
situation in the Liberian intervention, coordination between forces was inefficient 
because of a diversity of equipment and doctrines. “Both Anglophone and Francophone 
countries failed to provide bilingual officers, and communication between national 
contingents was therefore often difficult.”37 
In Guinea Bissau the two parties to the conflict agreed in advance to the 
deployment of an ECOMOG force to monitor the cease-fire, and facilitate a formal end to 
the conflict. Insofar as this was a consensual peacekeeping mission, the prospects for 
success should have been better than in the previous two missions.  However, for a 
variety of reasons, ECOMOG troops failed to sustain the cease-fire, and its 600 troops 
were then unable to effectively carry out the mission. The pace of disarmament, and the 
control of the belligerents, was slow, which contributed to the resumption of violence 
between the two parties. Although many countries had criticized the dominant role of 
Nigeria in Liberia and Sierra Leone, its absence from the intervention in Guinea Bissau 
meant that ECOMOG was unable to provide sufficient peacekeepers, leading to complete 
failure of the mission. Moreover, “without substantial French assistance, ECOWAS 
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would have been hard-pressed to field even this smaller ECOMOG force on its own.”38 
Most ECOMOG operational shortcomings, witnessed particularly in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, were generated by the lack of homogeneity of forces and the deficiency of 
military professionalism. In addition, ECOMOG was not well equipped to deal with 
peace operations in a hostile environment. Unfortunately, this shortage of expertise and 
skill is inherent in the nature of the West African military environment. Because 
ECOMOG forces necessarily come from different countries, doctrine, training, language 
and equipment are radically diverse. The deployment of such a multinational force under 
those conditions, without previous preparation and coordination, constitutes the main 
reason for its frequent failures.  
d. Financial and Logistical Problems 
From the beginning of its first deployment in Liberia, ECOMOG lacked 
reliable financial and logistical support. When ECOMOG was initially created, it was 
made explicit that each country had to support its troops for the first three months. Three 
months was the time necessary for ECOWAS to ensure adequate funding to sustain the 
mission for the duration of the intervention. Unfortunately, at the end of three months, 
ECOWAS did not provide the resources promised to carry out this responsibility. Its 
practice of relying only on voluntary contributions of the member states to cover the costs 
of the military intervention was a miscalculation. This was true because most of 
ECOMOG’s contributing countries had limited resources; therefore they were often 
unable to respond, even to the urgent needs of their own forces at home. 
In the Liberian case, most of the financial and logistical problems were 
caused by the incapacity of ECOWAS member states to sustain the high cost of military 
operations. It was obvious from on the onset of the mission that, without external support, 
ECOWAS would be unable to fund such a multinational force. Given the lack of reliable 
funding to sustain ECOMOG, contributing countries continued to support their own 
forces, individually, despite financial shortages often being experienced at home. 
Fortunately, the cost of the mission was borne mainly by Nigeria, because this country 
was the only country within ECOWAS that had, relatively speaking, adequate means and 
capacities to support such forces. But Nigeria also acted in order to consolidate its own 
 
38 Berman ,G and Sams,E 133. 
22 
                                                
aspirations of building regional hegemony. Many argued that without the Nigerian 
support, the intervention in Liberia would not have lasted. In the absence of unified 
logistical structure, most of ECOMOG’s other contingents suffered from logistical 
problems throughout the period of their deployment in Liberia due to their being away 
from their home countries. “The peacekeepers depended on their own government for 
transportation, uniforms, foods, weapons and ammunition, although Nigeria provided all 
participants with fuel and lubricants”39. Due to this deficiency, many contingent troops 
lacked adequate equipment to be deployed in a difficult environment, most of 
ECOMOG’s contingents landed in Liberia with inadequate equipments and obsolete 
material. Furthermore, their communication equipment was often incompatible, being 
manufactured in different locations, making all operational liaisons more difficult.  
The same problems reappeared in Sierra Leone. With the escalation of 
fighting against the rebels, ECOMOG became increasingly unable to provide itself with 
the necessary means and resources to face the new challenges .Financial and logistical 
deficiencies again kept ECOMOG from pursuing its mission of peace enforcement with 
adequate zeal, and limited ECOMOG’s effectiveness in the field. ECOWAS was once 
again unable to fulfill its commitment to ensure adequate and permanent funding to 
sustain ECOMOG during the Sierra Leonean mission. Contributing countries were also 
unable to cover the cost of the mission in Sierra Leone, or even to sustain their own 
forces on the ground. The aid pledged by the UN and the international community was 
also insufficient to respond to the increasing needs of ECOMOG to pursue its mission. 
Thus, “the international community’s response to ECOMOG’s difficulties was 
significantly below that which the situation demanded. The Security Council took many 
actions, but none that responded meaningfully to the severity of the crisis.”40 Only 
Nigeria, often criticized for its hegemonic aspirations, continued to regularly bear the 
burden of this mission. 
 At the start of the Guinea Bissau conflict, ECOMOG was already 
exhausted by its deployments in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In order to prevent the 
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repetition of problems experienced in those interventions, ECOMOG delayed its 
intervention until the UN and the international community contributed financially to 
support its mission in Guinea-Bissau. With the reception of the initial aid package from 
France, and after months of delays, ECOMOG decided to deploy a force to implement 
the cease-fire and monitor the peace plan. Unfortunately, despite those precautions, the 
deployment of ECOMOG in Guinea Bissau was very slow, and “repeated some of the 
mistakes of the Liberia and Sierra Leone interventions. The peacekeepers were 
logistically ill-equipped for their mission; the number of troops being grossly insufficient 
to maintain security in the country. Furthermore, the funding for the mission depended 
entirely on France, an external power which had its own interest in the outcome of the 
conflict in Guinea-Bissau.”41  
In short, ECOWAS met difficulties in establishing reliable funding to 
support its military body, which was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 
efficient implementation of its missions of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. 
ECOWAS always relied on assistance from the international community, and on the 
voluntary contributions of its member states. Neither alternative responded to the 
increasing needs of ECOMOG. In every intervention, regional and international 
assistance was well below that needed to perform peace-keeping and peace-enforcement 
missions and undertake stabilization and humanitarian actions in devastated countries. On 
the other hand, these shortages did not prevent ECOWAS, from pursuing its missions, 
pending the UN to intervene with sufficient means.   
2. Regional Political Struggle 
Among the most serious political problems that ECOWAS faced in attempting to 
resolve the civil wars in West Africa were 1) the lack of regional consensus on security 
issues and 2) the rivalries between the two main blocs (i.e., Francophone and Anglophone 
countries). ECOMOG, which depended mainly on the contributions and support of member 
states, was afflicted with this constant dissension. Many West African countries opposed 
ECOMOG operations and ironically supported one or another of the fighting factions, both 
militarily and politically. The political struggle between the Francophone and the 
Anglophones has its roots in the earliest days of the independence. This struggle has always 
 
41  Adekeye A .,139. 
24 
                                                
been among the biggest obstacles to the economic and political integration of this region, and 
has had a major influence on security issues in West Africa. This region is considered a zone 
of French influence, where the French still have vital interests and a conspicuous military 
presence. Many independent Francophone countries still depend on the French presence in 
this region for their own security, which often irritates Nigeria’s sensitivities, and presents a 
challenge in its quest for regional hegemony.  
By 1963, most of France’s African territories had gained political 
independence. But Paris continued to maintain influence through an 
intricate network of political, military, economic and cultural ties. Thirteen 
African countries tied their Communaute Financiere Africaine (CFA) 
franc to the France franc, giving Paris effective control over their foreign 
reserves. Cooperation agreements gave France priority access to Africa’s 
strategic minerals.”42 Also having antecedents in the past is the friction 
between France and Nigeria about security issues in West Africa. “During 
the Nigerian’s civil war between 1967 and 1970, the rivalry between 
Nigeria and France was again evident when France set up a loan scheme 
with Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon to supply arms to secessionist Biafra.  
French mercenaries were also sent to assist the Biafrans.  French president 
Charles de Gaulle had been particularly angered by Nigeria’s severance of 
diplomatic relations with France in 1961 to protest French atomic tests in 
the Sahara43. 
The creation of ECOWAS in 1975 was at the instigation of Nigeria, intended to 
limit the expansion of French influence in West Africa through the Communaute 
Economique de l’Afrique de l‘Ouest (CEAO). The adoption of the ECOWAS protocol of 
Non-Aggression, “which marked the first stage in the establishment of an ECOWAS 
security framework”44, was a response aimed to counter-act the Accord de Non-
Aggression et d’Assistance en Matiere de Defence (ANAD), which stood for the security 
framework of the Francophone countries. “But as in the economic sphere, the 
Anglophone/Francophone rivalry spilled over into the military sphere”45. Because of the 
French “neocolonial ambitions in West Africa”, these events still had an effect on the 
relationship between France and Nigeria, who aspired to a hegemonic role in this region.  
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Afraid of losing its influence in West Africa due to the increasing role of Nigeria, 
France stirred up the rivalry between Francophone countries, led by Côte d’Ivoire, and 
Anglophone states, led by Nigeria. Thus, the political struggle between Nigeria and Côte 
d'Ivoire for regional leadership became intense. The political rivalry between the two 
blocs was fueled by the adoption of the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on 
Defense by ECOWAS. Initially, some Francophone countries opposed the adoption of 
this protocol, “fearing the potentially overbearing influence of Nigeria.”46  For its part, 
“Nigeria regarded the protocol as a further chance to weaken France’s grip on its former 
colonies by making them more dependent on Nigeria in the military sphere, as it has tried 
to do in the economic sphere through ECOWAS.”47 The dissension over security issues 
culminated with the advent of the Liberian crisis. The decision to create ECOMOG and 
intervene in Liberia fueled the political confrontation between the Anglophone and the 
Francophone countries in general, and between Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire in particular. 
While the former supported the military intervention, the latter advocated a diplomatic 
process. When the SMC made the decision to intervene in Liberia, the dominance of 
Anglophone countries in ECOMOG, along with the commitment of Nigeria to solve the 
Liberian crisis by military means, further inflamed regional rivalries and suspicions. The 
Francophone countries feared that Nigeria, among the leading English-speaking countries 
in the SMC, would impose its hegemony over the entire region.  There was no agreement 
within the region about the preferable outcome of the conflict in Liberia.  Moreover, the 
presidents of Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso had a visceral hatred of Liberian President 
Samuel Doe, and supported the NPFL rebels.  Nigeria meanwhile was a long time ally of 
Doe. The Francophone countries considered the decision to deploy armed forces to 
intervene internal conflicts improper. From their point of view, the intervention was 
unilaterally decided by the SMC, which was mandated by ECOWAS only to mediate 
disputes between member states, not to intervene in internal conflicts. The SMC appeared 
to have anticipated the peace plan through the establishment of the ECOMOG without 
engaging in serious negotiations with the warring factions, and without acquiring the 
approval of the rest of member states of the Community.  Needless to say, the 
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Francophone countries opposed the military option. They argue that the Anglophone bloc 
had not allowed enough time for the political option, preferring, instead, the use of force 
in order to press the fighting parties into a peace process brokered by ECOWAS. The 
hasty deployment of the ECOMOG on an ad hoc basis, without the political consensus of 
all member states, did not reflect the desire of the majority within the regional 
organization. Thus, the predominant role of the member states of the SMC, led by 
Nigeria, had generated substantial controversy in regard to the legitimacy of the mission. 
“The deployment of an ECOMOG force comprised almost entirely of Anglophone 
member states underscored the political division within ECOWAS.”48  
Political disagreements within ECOWAS prevented the majority of member states 
from contributing forces to the ECOMOG, or financially supporting the mission in 
Liberia. Côte d’Ivoire's and Burkina Faso's continued to support of the NPFL to sustain 
the conflict, and undermined ECOWAS efforts to bring the main fighting parties to the 
negotiation table early in the intervention. The lack of political consensus with regard to 
the Liberian crisis also prevented ECOMOG from building an adequate environment for 
political resolution of civil war in this country.  
In Sierra Leone, the political rivalry seemed less pronounced, despite disagreement on the 
use of the military option against the AFRC/RUF, by Nigeria’s unilateral attempt, on 
June 2, 1997 to drive the junta out of power. Moreover, the Nigerian action did not 
prevent ECOWAS member states during a meeting in Conakry, Guinea on June 27, 1997, 
to reach a consensus upon the Sierra Leone crisis and appeal for the use of force until the 
exhaustion of all peaceful means, Nigeria for the second time unilaterally deployed its 
forces on February 15, 1998, this time to topple the military junta and restore the 
country's elected president to power on March 1998. 
1. Reinstatement of the legitimate government 
2. The initiation of dialogue with the rebels 
3. The imposition of sanctions and enforcement of an embargo 
4. The use of force in the case of non-compliance.  
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Despite the opposition of Burkina Faso, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia to the 
Unlike the Liberian intervention, there was a relative degree of political consensus upon 
the Sierra Leonean crisis, among ECOWAS member states, regarding the mandate given 
to ECOMOG in Sierra Leone. For a while, this political consensus was threatened 
because of the ambivalence role of Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso and the Nigerian’s 
unilateral action upon the interpretation of the mandate. Fortunately, political 
developments in Nigeria contributed to the rapprochement between the two blocs. “After 
Abacha’s death in June 1998, relations briefly improved between the Abubakar regime in 
Abuja and Abidjan.”49 However, Charles Taylor of Liberia, together with the leader of 
the RUF, presented the biggest obstacles to resolving the civil war in Sierra Leone 
because of their prominent role in the illegal exploitation of diamonds. Taylor authorized 
the RUF rebels to use Liberian territory for a safe haven, and supported them militarily in 
fighting against ECOMOG. Côte d’Ivoire also initially supported the RUF rebels, but 
during the course of the intervention it became increasingly involved in the peace 
process. With the rapprochement between Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire, the two countries 
became actively involved in brokering negotiations between the fighting parties. But the 
dominant role of Nigeria in ECOMOG, together with its unilateral actions in managing 
the conflict without consulting other countries, remained an obstacle to developing 
consensus among all member states. Burkina Faso and Liberia continued to support the 
RUF throughout the course of the civil war, complicating any peace process and 
undermining ECOMOG’s mission in this country.  
In Guinea Bissau regional consensus was for the first time in evidence. This 
consensus was reached for three reasons.  First, the political rivalry between Anglophone 
and Francophone countries had been improving in the years immediately preceding the 
conflict.  The region was already suffering from protracted conflicts in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, where the antagonism between the two blocs had made it difficult to resolve the 
crises. Member states of ECOWAS were conscious of the negative consequences 
associated with the continual competition between the two sides. As a result, they had 
joined in the effort to mediate between the belligerents, with hopes of convincing them of 
the necessity of reaching a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The majority of member 
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states of ECOWAS condemned both the coup attempt and the unilateral military 
interventions of Senegal and Guinea. The fact that lusophone Guinea Bissau belonged to 
neither of the two main linguistic blocs, served to attenuate the political rivalry between 
Anglophone and Francophone countries. In addition, the active role played by Portugal 
and other Portuguese-speaking countries (such as Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, 
Mozambique, and São Tome and Principé) in brokering a peace plan for Guinea Bissau, 
pressed ECOWAS member states to reach a consensus in order to prevent external 
powers from intervening in their region. Finally, the volatility of this region and the threat 
of contagion to other countries, prompted ECOWAS member states to address this 
conflict before the regional security situation deteriorated further.  In their meeting in 
Abuja on November 1st, 1998, member states of ECOWAS had no difficulty brokering a 
peace plan and appealing Senegalese and Guineans forces to withdrew, and deploying 
ECOMOG to ensure security and order.  
3. Problems of Peacemaking 
The main problem that ECOMOG faced on the ground during the seven years of 
intervention in Liberia was the proliferation of fighting factions. This greatly complicated 
mediation efforts, which in turn complicated ECOMOG's mission and made 
implementing peace agreements more difficult. During the first five years of ECOMOG’s 
intervention, ECOWAS sponsored a series of peace agreements, all of which ultimately 
failure due to its inability to deal impartially with different factions in the conflict. 
“ECOWAS was involved in fourteen mediation attempts. Twelve of these efforts were 
mostly dead on arrival. The only two that seemed to have a chance were the Cotonou and 
Abuja II Accords.”50  As political stand-off and military stalemate continued to block 
resolution of the conflict, new warring movements emerged, driven by looting and illegal 
exploitation of natural resources. ECOMOG became overloaded with the responsibility 
of securing a fragmented country that was under the control of many warlords. It did not 
achieve its original goal of defeating the main faction, nor did it succeed in convincing 
the parties to the conflict to adhere to a peace pact. After the Cotonou Peace Agreement 
of July 1993, sponsored by ECOWAS, the UN decided to join the peace process. On 
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September 22, 1993, the Security Council, by means of Resolution 866, established the 
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). The collaborative effort was 
established to aid in supervising and monitoring the implementation of the signed peace 
plans, and to restore ECOMOG’s neutrality and legitimacy (something which had been 
previously contested). According to Adibe, “the United Nations was invited to join the 
search for peace effort in Liberia only after ECOWAS had failed to make any appreciable 
progress towards conflict resolution.”51 
The ambitious vision of ECOMOG to resolve the Liberian civil war by bringing 
the fighting elements under control, turned out to be the wrong approach to coping with 
problems on the ground. Peace plans were regularly violated by the fighting parties 
because of the presence of “spoilers.” During the civil war in Liberia, the criminal 
exploitation of natural resources had flourished, existing in a climate of competition 
between the warlords. These warlords were more motivated by the occupation of more 
territories for their profitable criminal activities than they were for peace. The leaders of 
fighting factions were encouraged to pursue their predatory policies in order to draw 
more wealth to support the effort of war and recruit more rebels to fortify their 
movements by the availability of exportable resources.  Each fighting movement aspired 
to build more strength in order to eliminate the others, and in order to realize a 
comfortable position during the negotiation over power. For this reason, a race toward the 
capture of more exploited resources became an incentive to continue to “spoil” all peace 
plans that did not correspond to the aspiration of the fighting parties. At a certain phase of 
the conflict, the ambition of most of the Liberian fighting factions was the rise to power 
by the means of fighting. Under those circumstances, the warlords, acting as “spoilers” 
during the peace processes, complicated much of ECOWAS’ peacemaking actions; 
“disputes over power and resources are usually the most difficult to resolve”.52 
Moreover, such behaviors compromised the ECOMOG and the UNOMIL mission in 
monitoring the cease-fire and in pursuing disarmament, demobilization and encampment 
of fighters, as stated normally by the previous peace agreements.  
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Having spent five frustrating years opposing Taylor’s ambitions, Nigeria 
finally accepted Ghana’s idea that only the direct inclusion of warlords in 
an interim government could bring peace to Liberia. The Akosombo 
agreement was the first one to allow the warlords to serve on the Council 
of State without being disqualified from contesting elections.53   
At the regional level, this change of policy was tied to the domestic political 
situation in some contributing countries of ECOMOG. “Some of participant countries, 
including Ghana and Nigeria, began to show some political fatigue with regard to 
continuing the intervention and finding a mediated solution.”54  Ghanaian President Jerry 
Rawlings, in his role of Chairman of ECOWAS, played an important part in convincing 
Nigeria to seek a political resolution of the conflict.  Nigeria was looking for an exit 
strategy from Liberia and for an amelioration of its image at home as it sought to cope 
with its own unfolding internal political crisis. Another factor contributing to the change 
of strategy was the reconciliation between Charles Taylor and Nigerian President Sani 
Abacha, which culminated in Taylor's visit to Abuja in June 1995.55  The Abuja visit 
rehabilitated Charles Taylor as a credible partner in future peace processes. According to 
Adekeye, at “the sub regional level, consensus continued to increase following the 
rapprochement between Nigeria and Charles Taylor in 1995. Burkina Faso, the strongest 
NPFL supporter throughout the civil war, started to play a more constructive role in 
support of ECOMOG. Côte d’Ivoire, the other erstwhile backer of the NPFL, took further 
steps to play a neutral role in the conflict as the instability from the Liberian civil war 
continued to spill over into its territory.”56 ECOWAS also began to stress the importance 
of a good relationship between member states, particularly the reconciliation between the 
Francophone and the Anglophone states, and the need to build a stronger consensus 
regarding important issues related to the conflict. This change of strategy satisfied the 
most recalcitrant antagonists, while bringing all parties to the negotiating table to achieve 
more suitable peace agreements. 
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In this context, and following the Abuja peace agreement sponsored by the UN 
and ECOWAS, and signed on August 19, 1995 (which replaced the Cotonou and 
Akosombo peace accords), a cease-fire was reached between the different factions. This 
peace accord produced the beginnings of the resolution of Liberian civil war. 
Accordingly ECOMOG and UNOMIL were deployed throughout the country to monitor 
the cease-fire and disarm the combatants.57 
However the provisions of this agreement had broadened the responsibilities of 
ECOMOG, particularly in calling for it to disarm and demobilize fighters throughout the 
Liberian territory. To implement such operations, ECOMOG required more peacekeepers 
on the ground. As the political situation in Liberia evolved, the UN became more 
involved in this conflict. Three hundred UN peacekeepers were deployed alongside the 
ECOMOG forces to supervise the cease-fire and peace process until the execution of the 
legislative and presidential elections. After this agreement, ECOMOG succeeded to a 
great extent in disarming and demobilizing fighters by collecting massive quantities of 
weapons. 
In the course of the implementation of this peace plan, many new difficulties 
surfaced, all related to the shortage of financial and logistical resources to sustain the 
operation of disarmament, demobilization and humanitarian assistance. This stalemate 
led, once more, to the resumption of fighting between undisciplined warlords. With the 
degradation of the security situation, and the failure of the Abuja peace accord, during the 
OUA meeting in July 1996 in Yaoundé, many heads of state and governments expressed 
their willingness to ask the Security Council to impose hard sanctions against the 
Liberian warlords in cases of non-compliance. “The OUA will help sponsor a draft 
resolution in the UN Security Council for imposition of severe sanctions… including the 
possibility of the setting up of a war crimes tribunal to try the leadership of the Liberian 
factions on the gross violations of the humans rights of Liberians.”58 This meeting led to 
another Abuja peace plan and prepared the conditions of its successful implementation by 
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appealing to the international community to contribute to funding ECOMOG and 
UNOMIL so that they could fulfill their missions. Afterwards, ECOMOG became 
actively involved in implementing the new peace plan, supervising legislative and 
presidential elections that led to the election of the former warlord, Charles Taylor, as 
president of Liberia. The settlement of the Liberian crisis was finally achieved by the 
implementation of the Abuja II peace accord, after seven years of ECOMOG’s military 
operations against the fighting factions  
In contrast to the Liberian case, ECOWAS/ECOMOG tried to negotiate with the 
AFRC/RUF for the settlement of the conflict via political means in Sierra Leone before 
settling on the use of force. When such diplomatic initiatives failed to convince the junta 
to resign, Nigeria intervened unilaterally on June 1, 1997, but did not succeed to drive the 
junta out of power. Because of the coalition between the RUF and the AFRC, the 
Nigerian forces failed to achieve this goal. After this Nigerian unsuccessful intervention, 
ECOWAS, with the cooperation of the OAU, convened a meeting on 26 June 1997, in 
Guinea upon the Sierra Leonean crisis, following the degradation of the security situation 
in this country. During this meeting, member states of ECOWAS reached a consensus 
about the Sierra Leonean crisis and called for the reinstatement of the legitimate 
government, the initiation of a dialogue with the rebels, the imposition of sanctions and 
enforcement of an embargo, and the use of force in case of non-compliance. Nigeria had 
succeeded in influencing ECOWAS to formally endorse the use of force to drive the 
junta/RUF out of power in Sierra Leone. With the failure of diplomatic efforts after the 
breakdown of the Conakry peace plan, and the escalation of tensions intensified between 
the Junta and the Nigerian forces present in the country in the framework of Liberian 
conflict since 1990. This situation prompted Nigeria to intervene militarily for a second 
time in February 1998, and succeeded to oust the AFRC/RUF from power.  
After the Nigerian intervention and the reinstatement of the elected president, the 
UN became actively involved in this conflict: “…in June 1998, the Security Council 
established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) for an 
initial period of six months. The Secretary-General named Special Envoy Okelo as his 
Special Representative and Chief of Mission. The mission monitored and advised efforts 
to disarm combatants and restructure the nation's security forces. Unarmed UNOMSIL 
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teams, under the protection of ECOMOG, documented reports of on-going atrocities and 
human rights abuses committed against civilians.”59 The UN mandated ECOMOG to 
remain in the country in order to deploy its own forces to secure the countryside and 
contribute alongside the UNOMSIL in disarming and demobilizing combatants, as well 
as forming and training the new Sierra Leonean army. 
Despite the overthrow of the rebels from power in Freetown, fighting continued 
with the rebel forces in the hinterlands. In an attempt to secure the rest of the country, 
ECOMOG engaged in offensive attacks against the AFRC and the RUF. Simultaneous to 
the military intervention, the UN, ECOWAS and ECOMOG continued sponsoring 
political negotiations. Given the military stalemate, the uncertainty of the political 
situation in Sierra Leone, and the financial and logistical constraints, these institutions 
were unable to enforce security, or defeat the rebels. For this reason, they exerted 
pressure on the parties to the conflict to join the peace process. Their joint efforts led to 
the Lomé Peace Agreement of July 7, 1999, between the government of Sierra Leone and 
the RUF and AFRC. This peace agreement provided a framework for the transformation 
of the RUF into a political party, and granted general amnesty to the rebels for atrocities 
committed in the past against innocent populations. It also called for the deployment of 
the UN peacekeeping mission, initially run by ECOMOG, in order to implement the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program in Sierra Leone. 
On October 22, 1999, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was 
created and the size of forces was expanded. “The Security Council authorized the 
establishment of UNAMSIL, a new and much larger mission with a maximum of 6,000 
military personnel, including 260 military observers, to assist the Government and the 
parties in carrying out provisions of the Lomé peace agreement. At the same time, the 
Council decided to terminate UNOMSIL.”60 ECOMOG and UNAMSIL continued jointly 
to monitor the peace process. But the Lomé peace agreement, particularly Article XIII 
(Transformation and New Mandate of ECOMOG), was a prelude to ECOMOG’s 
withdrawal from Sierra Leone. This article stipulated that “the Parties agree to develop a 
timetable for the phased withdrawal of ECOMOG, including measures for securing all of 
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the territory of Sierra Leone by the restructured armed forces. The phased withdrawal of 
ECOMOG will be linked to the phased creation and deployment of the restructured 
armed forces.”61  
Considering the new situation in this region, particularly the increase of the UN 
involvement and with the transition to democratic rule in Nigeria, Nigeria started 
expressing its intention to withdraw from Sierra Leone. Because of an aggravation of the 
financial and logistical hardships experienced by ECOMOG, other contributing countries 
followed in Nigeria’s footsteps. This led to the withdrawal of the majority of ECOMOG’s 
forces from Sierra Leone and the takeover by UN forces. 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG failed in its mission of peacemaking in Sierra Leone 
because of the presence of spoilers who had an “egregious past,” and who were 
motivated more an interest in plundering natural resources than by the fulfillment of any 
political agenda. The illegal exploitation of mineral resources by many regional actors, 
particularly Liberia, contributed significantly to sustaining the RUF war efforts, thus 
protracting the conflict and preventing ECOMOG from fully implementing its mission. 
In the Guinea Bissau case, ECOWAS attempted to mediate between the two 
belligerents in order to solve this conflict following the outbreak of violence. But external 
mediation again diluted its efforts. “Following consultations with the lusophone CPLP, 
consisting of Portugal, Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Mozambique, São Tome and 
Principé, Guinea Bissau’s warring factions signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a 
Portuguese frigate, Corte-Real, on 26 July 1998. The agreement called for the withdrawal 
of Senegalese and Guinean troops from Guinea-Bissau and their replacement by military 
observers from lusophone states.”62 ECOWAS reacted by holding a meeting in Abuja on 
November 1st, 1998 to negotiate a cease-fire between the two antagonists, and brokering 
a peace plan for this conflict. A decision was reached that forced president Joao Bernardo 
Vieira and General Mane to sign a peace agreement that called for a cease-fire, the  
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establishment of a unified national government, ordering the withdrawal of Senegal and 
Guinea’s military forces from the country and a simultaneous call came for the 
deployment of ECOMOG. 
Thus, ECOWAS mediation here successfully negotiated a cease-fire and a peace 
accord between the belligerents. It also mandated ECOMOG to interpose its own forces 
in a mission of peacekeeping. Despite the efforts of ECOWAS to resolve this conflict, 
financial and logistical hardships again prevented the successful implementation of the 
peace process. In addition to the burden being borne by ECOWAS/ECOMOG 
simultaneously in Liberia and Sierra Leone, their mission in Guinea Bissau became 
overtaxed, anticipating its premature withdrawal from Guinea Bissau without achieving 
all of its assigned goals.  The main difficulties faced by ECOMOG in achieving its 
mission in Guinea-Bissau were caused by two factors.  First, the financial and logistical 
hardships already being experienced in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the lack of support 
from the international community, hindered the deployment of sufficient peacekeepers to 
monitor and implement the peace agreement. And second, the two protagonists in the 
conflict sabotaged ECOMOG’s efforts to implementing the peace process.  
In the three conflicts studied, ECOWAS tried to address the crises through 
political means and mediation. But the complexity of the political situations in those 
countries, combined with ECOWAS’ inability to play an efficient mediator role, 
contributed to the stalemate of most peace processes. Initially, ECOWAS became 
embroiled in the conflict in Liberia, supporting one faction against the others, and 
imposing solutions instead of encouraging discussion between parties. This was due in 
large part to its lack of expertise in conducting peacemaking missions. Over time,  
ECOWAS became more aware of its role as leader organization in resolving regional 
crises. This responsibility enhanced ECOWAS to respond to new challenges with 
neutrality and impartiality.  
4. International Cooperation 
Because of the increased political instability in West Africa and the motivation of 
African countries to handle regional security issues, the international community has  
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become increasingly involved in the training and the equipment of African forces for 
peacekeeping missions. It was also partly motivated by ECOMOG’s shortcomings in 
Liberia. 
France, the USA and the UK joined efforts in order to help build African 
capabilities in peace operations, with the cooperation of the UN. In May 
1997, they announced their “P-3 Initiative, which sought to begin dialogue 
with African countries as to how to best promote peace and security on the 
continent.”63  
In 1997, the USA set up the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). “ACRI's 
objective was to enhance the capacity of African nations to better perform peacekeeping 
and relief tasks and thus encourage regional self-reliance. This policy initiative seeks to 
promote common doctrine, interoperability and standard communications technology 
among African forces. ACRI encourages joint training exercises between African forces 
to hone their capacity to respond in emergency situations”64 . Since its inception, 
particularly in West Africa, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Benin and Côte d’Ivoire, have 
received training relating exclusively to peacekeeping doctrines. Already, many ACRI 
trained troops were deployed in peacekeeping missions in Guinea Bissau.. “In supporting 
of the program’s objectives to encourage broad-based peacekeeping cooperation 
throughout Africa, ACRI had expended $15 million in FY 1997 FY, $22 million in FY 
1998, and planned to expend more during the following years.”65  In parallel with the 
ACRI, the American Operation Focus Relief (OFR) program was also created to 
contribute to the training of African forces to intervene in complex peace operations. 
“OFR was more particularly a response to the needs of ECOWAS countries engaged in 
Sierra Leone through the ECOMOG force and the UN mission. Battalions from Senegal, 
Nigeria and Ghana were trained under this programme, which has now been wound 
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up.”66  With the program of the Renforcement des Capacites Africaines de Maintien de la 
Paix (RECAMP), France was more active in training the military from many countries in 
Africa, particularly those that were Francophone. “The RECAMP program was 
deliberately placed under UN auspices and coordinates with OAU. Its purpose is to 
increase the military capacity of African countries to engage in peace-keeping operations 
should they wish to. It helps strengthen Africa's sub-regional organizations on security 
issues by contributing to the development of a climate of mutual trust.”67 “Côte d'Ivoire 
has developed With French support, a Peace-Keeping Training Center in Zambakro 
(currently located in Koulikouro, Mali).”68 
Those programs provided an opportunity for West African countries to enhance 
the training of their forces by using the same equipment and doctrine, a necessary tactic 
for uniting the multinational forces deployed in peacekeeping efforts. Accordingly, 
“various observers believe that the quick entry of well-trained combat forces could have 
prevented much of Africa’s recent suffering. UNAMSIL’s failure in Sierra Leone --
followed by the success of British combat forces during mid-2000-- has greatly 
encouraged this belief.”69 Due to the efforts of many countries involved in training and 
equipping West African militaries, their performance and the capabilities should be 
increasing, in turn, helping them to conduct better peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
missions in the future. 
5. Conclusion 
In sum, from 1990 to 2000 ECOMOG was involved in three internal conflicts in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. It endured a decade of deep struggles to bring 
peace and stabilize the sub-region of West Africa. ECOMOG’s interventions aimed at 
ensuring peace enforcement and in peacekeeping and peace building in the three 
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countries. However, in the absence of any international response, these interventions 
were an improvisational response that lacked any formal regional mechanism or 
organizational structure to achieve such complex missions. Thus, as a pioneer in 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, ECOMOG encountered difficulties, 
achieved some successes and experienced failures. These first three interventions turned 
out to be much more difficult than ECOWAS had anticipated. With minimal domestic 
resources and inexperienced military personnel, ECOMOG tried to achieve collective 
security in West Africa, a goal the UN had been pursuing for decades without success. 
Among these difficulties were the shortage of logistical and financial resources, efficient 
command and control of forces, lack of planning and poor coordination, the lack of 
consensus between member states of ECOWAS, and a lack of international support.  
Many scholars and observers are still debating the successes and failures of 
ECOMOG’s interventions in West African countries. As Adekeye Adebajo stated: “a key 
challenge ... for the ECOWAS security mechanism is to learn the lessons from the fact 
that all three ECOMOG interventions were highly improvised. There was no clear 
mandate on exactly what the troops would be doing. Peacekeepers were sent into fragile 
environments without adequate logistical support and funding and without a political 
settlement."70 Other observers have considered the fact that ECOMOG’s interventions 
were successful operations since the civil wars were ended through its means. This 
assessment was supported by Mitikishe Maxwell Khobe, former Chief of Defense Staff, 
of the republic of Sierra Leone when he declared: 
All ECOMOG intervention operations have so far been successful. They 
have forced armed groups to accept negotiations that, in most cases, led to 
a cease-fire. ECOMOG is normally asked to monitor and enforce the 
provisions of the cease-fire. Because the factions that signed these cease-
fire agreements do not do so in good faith, violations are rampant. This 
compels ECOMOG to use force to get the recalcitrant parties to adhere to 
what was agreed. Sometimes, this will involve outright and large-scale 
military operations against the most belligerent insurgent group or groups. 
ECOMOG missions, at this stage, change from intervention to peace 
enforcement. At all stages, the ECOWAS Secretariat is kept informed.71 
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ECOMOG was deployed in Liberia for seven years, and accomplished some 
successes. Despite the challenges it met over the years of the intervention in this country, 
to a certain extent ECOMOG played an important role in creating favorable conditions 
for the peaceful resolution of the civil war. Since the beginning of its deployment in 
1990, ECOMOG became increasingly engaged in ensuring security and order in this 
country. The protection of civilian populations was among its priorities, who had suffered 
from the actions of all parties in the conflict. Thus, with the cooperation of humanitarian 
organizations, ECOMOG became engaged in many humanitarian operations. ECOMOG 
also contributed significantly to preventing the conflict from spilling over into 
neighboring countries. This was done by restricting the rebels’ circulation across porous 
borders. 
Throughout the course of the intervention in Liberia, ECOMOG supported 
ECOWAS in its efforts to broker peace plans, and influenced fighting factions to comply 
with the provisions of the peace agreements. Its peace enforcement actions convinced 
parties to put down their arms and opt for the peaceful resolution of their conflicts. 
During the implementation of the Abuja peace plan, ECOMOG actively participated in 
monitoring the cease-fire agreement, disarmament and demobilization of combatants, and 
supervising new elections. 
In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG succeeded in reinstating constitutional order and 
legality by restoring the elected president to power and evicting rebels from the capital. 
This important achievement did not prevent ECOMOG from continuing its mission to 
pacify the country and engaging in peace enforcement actions against the rebels in the 
hinterlands. Those peace enforcement actions contributed to the reduction of atrocities 
committed by the rebels against innocent populations. After the takeover by the UN, 
ECOMOG continued to be deployed in Sierra Leone to support them in effort to stabilize 
the country by implementing the peace process and training the new Sierra Leonean 
military troops. 
In Guinea Bissau, ECOMOG was engaged in separating the belligerents and 
monitoring a cease-fire. However, the logistical and financial problems encountered by 
this body prevented it from continuing its mission, thus anticipating its early withdrawal.  
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Despite its limited means and resources, ECOMOG performed peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement roles in order to prevent the continuous degeneration of the security 
situation in a volatile region. The most notable achievements of ECOMOG in this regard 
were first, its commitment to sustain the deployment of forces for ten years, despite the 
casualties and financial and logistical problems; second, its ability to put an end to the 
conflict and to prevent the relative escalation of conflicts into inter-state confrontations 
that would destabilize all regions; and third, ECOMOG’s strong capability to convince 
fighting factions to work together for a peaceful resolution to the conflicts. Moreover, 
ECOMOG’s intervention in these conflicts initiated a movement toward consensus on 
issues related to regional security, after decades of dissension among member states of 
ECOWAS. 
At the end of ten years of ECOMOG interventions, ECOWAS seemed to have 
learned lessons in terms of organizations; it become more aware of the importance of its 
shortcomings and looked for adequate solutions to overcome the past flaws. The 
organization took important steps to reform its institutions to better face the challenges of 
future missions. In order to correct past flaws, it revised its constitutional treaty and 
implemented many changes to move toward more standing and institutionalized 
structures in order to deal more effectively with future security issues. ECOWAS has 
already established the mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and 
peacekeeping, in order to meet the security challenges presented in West Africa. It is 
important to note that the rapprochement and the reconciliation between the regional 
blocs played a salient role in alleviating regional rivalry and division, thus achieving a 
better consensus on the important issues that could otherwise endanger and destabilize 
the whole region.  All of this being so, we should expect the current ECOWAS 
interventions in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire to be more effective than the pre-reform 







                                                
III. ECOWAS IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE AND LIBERIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The eruption of new conflicts in Côte d'Ivoire in 1999 and Liberia in 2000 again 
threatened regional stability in West Africa.  The experience of the recent past suggested 
that the longer a conflict continues, the more likely it is to become intractable and to 
diffuse across borders. For this reason, ECOWAS was got involved early in an effort to 
prevent the escalation of fighting between factions in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. In 
contract to past crises, ECOWAS favored mediation and negotiation to resolve those 
conflicts, instead of imposing solutions through deployment of forces. This approach of 
using various political mediations between parties to the conflicts is one sign that the 
organization is maturing as a conflict manager.  
The previous chapter demonstrated that earlier interventions were undertaken in a 
relatively ad hoc manner, without the support of the international community, and in the 
context of regional political divisions.  The ten years of civil war, in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Guinea Bissau triggered the change of many things at the international and 
regional levels.  ECOWAS developed a much more collaborative relationship with the 
UN, and this union became actively involved in maintaining peace and security in the 
region. Thus, the international community demonstrated a new will and commitment to 
help build West African capabilities to ensure peace and security by their own means. 
ECOWAS also implemented innovations in its organization to build more permanent 
structures, moving from an ad hoc basis to a standing and institutionalized structure for 
dealing with the regional security issues. ECOWAS took an initial step in this direction 
when it adopted the Protocol of Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and 
Resolution Peacekeeping and Security on December 10, 1999 in Lomé, Togo, to establish a 
sub regional conflict management system and to improve the effectiveness of future 
peace operations.72 Finally, regional political struggles between Francophone and  
 
72Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping 
and Security adopted on 10 December 1999 in Lomé, Togo.  
<http//www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/ pdfs/ecowas/ConflictMecha.pdf>.(2 February 2005). 
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Anglophone countries declined, due to democratic transitions in some countries and to a 
new awareness among ECOWAS member states of the importance of reaching consensus 
to meet the challenges of regional security.  
In the past, deficiencies in both external and internal factors had negatively 
influenced ECOWAS and ECOMOG, thereby caused most of theirs shortcomings. The 
salient question now was, “Would all these changes and innovations contribute to the 
enhancement of ECOWAS peacemaking missions and ECOMOG peacekeeping 
operations?” The interventions in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire give us some initial insight 
into this question, although  conclusions can only be tentative at this early date due to the 
relatively scarcity of information and research relating to the subject. It is also important 
to note that, because of a large external response and the rapid involvement of the UN in 
taking charge of peacekeeping tasks, ECOMOG’s recent interventions are substantially 
different from the former ones. For example, ECOMOG was not deployed in Côte 
d’Ivoire until after French forces were already on the ground. In Liberia, on the other 
hand, ECOMOG was deployed as a vanguard force with US assistance for a short period 
of time until the UN was able to generate its peacekeeping forces and takes over one 
month later.  This chapter will give a background of the two conflicts in order to explain 
both the volatility of the security situation in West Africa, and the urgent necessity of 
intervening to prevent the spill over of violence into other countries. It will then attempt 
to assess those interventions based on the international and regional political 
development towards conflict management in West Africa  
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CONFLICTS IN LIBERIA 
1.  Conflict in Liberia 
Conflict in Liberia renewed as a consequence of an inadequate resolution of the 
following problems inherited from first civil war: 
1. After seven year of violence, the fragile security situation that reigned 
in Liberia prevented the newly elected government from ensuring order 
and security throughout the country.  
2. The program of disarmament, demobilization and integration of 
combatants sponsored by the UN and ECOWAS was hastily 
implemented and not completely finished.  
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3. The premature withdrawal of ECOMOG from Liberia (under the 
pressure of Charles Taylor) handicapped the UN in pursuing its 
mission of peace building in a deteriorating environment without 
sufficient security forces on the ground. 
4.  The problem of refugees was inadequately solved; the refugee camps 
became the place to recruit for new insurgents that were plotting 
against the central government and against neighboring countries.  
5.  The policy of political exclusion implemented by Taylor toward his 
opponents.  
All these factors played an important role in the degradation of the already 
volatile security situation that prevailed at the end of the first civil war. Despite the 
election of Charles Taylor as president through an apparently valid and regular 
procedure, salient political problems inherited from the former Liberian crisis persisted. 
Most of his opponents, as well as part of the Liberian population, were not convinced that 
the polls were accurate because of the inadequate security environment prevailing at the 
time of the election. There was also an unequal access to resources and means to 
campaign for the election. Liberians voted for him to prevent the escalation of more 
violence because they knew he would resume the killing if he did not win the election.73 
This led to increasing claims and complaints by the opposition about the irregularity of 
those elections, thereby damaging Taylor’s legitimacy among some groups of the 
Liberian population. To establish his authority, Taylor surrounded himself with various 
groups of security forces, ready to put down any opposition to his regime. Then, he tried 
to achieve a monopoly on power by hijacking the institutions of the state for the personal 
enrichment of himself, his kinsmen, and loyalists, while ruthlessly suppressing rival 
leaders and groups74. 
The program of national reconciliation stipulated by the Abuja II peace plan failed 
because Taylor “cracked down on opposition and attempted to institutionalize his 
dominance of the Liberian state.”75  As a result, many opponents were arrested, killed or 
left the country. Despite his position as president, Taylor continued his criminal 
 
73 Fredeick H.Fleitz :Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990’s (Westport CT,Praeger Publishers,2004),111  
74 Roland Paris:At War’s End Building Peace After Civil Conflict.(Cambridge,the    presse syndicate 
of the university of Cambridge,2004),95  
75 Adebajo, A.,68 
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activities, smuggling weapons, in disregard of the UN arms embargo, and by plotting 
against neighbors by supporting and arming rebel groups in Sierra Leone and Côte 
d’Ivoire. At the domestic level, the security situation remained precarious four years after 
the end of the civil war. The mobilization of armed ethnic groups by rival warlords from 
the civil war led to continuing political problems in postwar Liberia.76  
Taylor’s policy of harassment and exclusion was the main cause of the outbreak 
of violence in Liberia. The rise of insurgency in 1999 was a logical response to his 
predatory behavior. As a result, fighting between the government’s forces and the main 
fighting faction, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) became 
intense. In the course of conflict, the LURD became more powerful by capturing more 
territory. By 2003, the escalation of conflict and the proliferation of other fighting 
factions, like the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), which split away from 
the LURD, led Liberia to a climate of more violence and anarchy, with disastrous effects 
on the precarious humanitarian situation in this country. 
2. Conflict in Côte d’Ivoire 
During the colonization period, the southern part of Côte d'Ivoire always received 
most of the economic development projects. Consequently, the northern part remained 
less developed. After its independence from France, Côte d'Ivoire was the most stable 
country in West Africa. Economically, it was the most prosperous nation of this region, 
drawing numerous immigrants from neighboring countries for labor to support its 
economic growth. Post-independence, President Felix Houphouet-Boigny did not 
improve the policy of favoring the southern part of the country in terms of economic 
development, but had managed to maintain a semblance of national unity and stability 
thought his thirty three years in office.77 
Following his death in 1993, this division between the north and the south 
remained among the most intractable problems in Côte d’Ivoire. The problem of division 
was created under President Bedié, who manipulated this situation for his own political 
agenda. The political situation worsened in this country when General Robert Guei led a 
 
76 Adebajo, A.,68 
77  Alexander K.D Frempong:Trajectories of Sub-regional Conflict Management :an Assessment of 
ECOWAS ,< http;// www.codesria.org/Links/conferences/ anniversary-dakar/frempong.pdf>.( 8 February 
2005) 
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coup d’etat in 1999 that ousted Henri Bedié. This event further inflamed the north-south 
division, particularly after Alassane Ouattara was banned from the presidential election in 
2000, on the premise that his parents were from Burkina Faso and he therefore did not 
meet the citizenship requirements to be a presidential candidate. As a result, the concept 
citizenship, which had been used as a political instrument of manipulation since the death 
of Houphouet-Boigny, became the most salient issue in this crisis.78 
After the irregular election of Gbagbo as president, violence and xenophobia 
became more apparent towards the northern population, often considered as foreigners 
and as the cause of economic and social problems in Côte d'Ivoire. According to Human 
Rights Watch, the election violence began with security forces targeting civilians on the 
basis of their political affiliations. Following Gbagbo's victory, security forces began 
targeting civilians solely and explicitly on the basis of their religion, ethnic group, or 
national origin.79 
In September 2002, a troop mutiny in Abidjan led to the outbreak of a full-scale 
rebellion and civil war in the country. In the aftermath, the country became divided into 
two parts based along ethnic and religious lines. The southern part was controlled by 
central government under Gbagbo and the northern part was controlled by the rebels 
under the lead of the ‘New Forces’, comprised of Patriotic Movement of Cote d’Ivoire 
(MPCI), Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) and Popular Ivorian Movement for the 
Far West (MPIGO).  This led to an escalation of the conflict between the two parties, 
triggering external political mediation and military intervention to separate the 
belligerents.  
C. EVOLUTION OF ECOWAS/ECOMOG’S INSTITUTIONAL 
STRUCTURES 
In the aftermath of the three interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea 
Bissau, ECOWAS initiated several processes to improve the effectiveness of its 
 
78 Jessica Kohler.From Miraculous to Disastrous: The Crisis in Cote d’Ivoire.Geneva, Centre of 
applied Studies in International Negotiations (CASIN),August 2003. 
<http://www.casin.ch/pdf/cotedivoire.pdf.>  (10 February 2005). 
79Human Rights Watch. Côte d'Ivoire: Politicians Incite Ethnic Conflict Available  
<http:////www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/WebResources?ReadForm&Country=Cote+d’Ivoire&
p=S U_rvcod>. (6 February 2005). 
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organizational structure. This was accomplished through the institution of a standing and 
permanent structure to better deal with regional security issues. Its efforts finally 
succeeded when the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution 
Peacekeeping and Security were established. The Mechanism replaced previous protocols 
relating to security matters; it was adopted by the majority of member states during their 
Summit in Lomé in 1999. The Mechanism is comprised of many institutions and organs, 
all aiming at improving economic development, stability, peace and security in West 
African countries. The factors dealing with the consolidation of peace and security are the 
following:  
1. Institutions 
The Mediation and Security Council, made up of nine members, is responsible for 
overseeing the activities of the organs and for making decisions relating to security 
issues, particularly the deployment of ECOMOG, and appointment of Force Commander 
The Executive Secretary, among other responsibilities, is accountable for the 
functioning of the Community and for the implementation of decisions of the Authority; 
he also has power to initiate actions for conflict prevention, management, resolution, 
peacekeeping and security in the sub region peace operation,80 and recommend the 
appointment of the Special Representative of the ECOWAS and the Force Commander. 
2. Organs Supporting Those Institutions 
The Defense and Security Commission is comprised of defense chiefs of staff of 
member states of ECOWAS, and is responsible for the preparation of the mission and the 
generation of forces to be deployed for peace operations. 
ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) is a multipurpose stand-by 
force ready to intervene at any time for regional crises under the auspices of the 
Mediation and Security Council. In this context, the Mechanism calls for the 
establishment of a brigade-sized stand-by force ready for the deployment at short 
notice.81 
 
80 Protocol relating to Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Peacekeeping 




                                                
This new organizational transformation seems to have all the instruments to 
prevent previous organizational shortcomings. The adoption of this Mechanism is a 
significant improvement in the institutional structure, but the funding and logistical 
support of peace operations was not clearly addressed. The establishment of a Special 
Peace Fund, designed to be funded by voluntary contributions, was not an efficient way 
to draw enough funding. The protocol's stipulation that the cost of any mission be funded 
by voluntary contributions from member states for the first three months of any mission. 
This domestic option and funding to be provided by the UN and international community 
thereafter had already been tested during the previous interventions and proven to be 
inadequate. 
ECOWAS’s financial capacity is so limited given the magnitude of the 
task involved in rendering the Mechanism effectively operational.  
ECOWAS relies on the Community levy or donor assistance. Records 
show that only countries like Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Nigeria have 
consistently honored their financial obligations towards the Community.82 
With regard to the applicability of the Mechanism, ECOWAS member states still 
lacked the will to implement its provisions; as of August 2002, only three states out of 
fifteen had ratified the protocol.83 The advent of new crises in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire 
presented an opportunity to test the applicability and the efficiency of the instrument. The 
institutions and organs of the Mechanisms reacted quickly to initiate peacemaking efforts 
in the two cases, as stipulated by the provisions of this Mechanism. But its response to 
the peacekeeping task was still inadequate. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, the designation 
of Force Commander, the deployment of troops of contributing countries, the generation 
of adequate numbers of forces, and the adoption of a peacekeeping mandate took 
approximately two months. The delay was due largely to financial and logistical 
constraints.84 
 
82 West Africa Network for peacebuilding:An assessment of the ECOWAS Mechanism for conflict 
prevention and good governance. 
<http://www.wanep.org/programs/image/ecowas_assessment_report.pdf>.(8 February 2005). 
83 ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution Peacekeeping and 
Security. <http:// www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/OPER_ECOWAS.pdf> (10February 2005). 
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D. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION  
The ACRI continued to be implemented.  It “helped train and equip more than 
6,000 troops from seven African nations in the years 1997 to 2000.”85  At its completion 
in 2002, another program, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance 
(ACOTA), was established to pursue the training and equipment of African 
peacekeepers. 
ACOTA focuses mainly on training military trainers and also equips 
African national armed forces. One of the main differences between ACRI 
and ACOTA is that the latter also includes weapons training, as well as 
increasing the experience of troops in areas such as human rights, 
interaction with civil society, international law, military staff skills and 
small unit operations.86  
At the same time, Britain had contributed to the establishment of the Kofi Annan 
peacekeeping training center in Ghana, and there were also financial contribution being 
made by Canada, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. Britain had trained the military of 
Ghana in peacekeeping processes through the African Peacekeeping Training Support 
Program.  The United Kingdom’s military support to African states has also played a 
crucial role in the development and effectiveness of local peacekeeping operations.
 France had also been more active in training militaries from many of Africa’s 
countries, particularly the Francophone ones, with the RECAMP program. Consequently, 
field exercises involving militaries from West African countries had been jointly 
executed. France had also contributed to equipping some African militaries for 
peacekeeping missions. Due to the lack of necessary equipment for peace operations 
witnessed  during  previous  ECOMOG  interventions,  France  had  proposed  to position  
 
84Lansana Gberie and Prosper Addo.Challenges of Peace Implementation in Côte d’Ivoire 
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86 The European Union  and peacekeeping in Africa .Report of  the Assembly of Western European 
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<http://www.assemblee-ueo.org/en/documents/ sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2004/1880.pdf >.( 8 
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equipment for three battalions that met UN standards on three of its bases in Africa. This 
equipment included communications equipment, vehicles and a field hospital with 
surgical unit of a 100-bed capacity87. 
Conscious of its dearth of logistical and financial means, ECOWAS developed 
partnerships with the international community to support its mission in Côte d’Ivoire and 
Liberia. In Côte d’Ivoire, international cooperation played an important role in sustaining 
ECOMOG. The US and France both contributed to the transportation of contingent 
troops, and offered much necessary equipment for the mission (e.g., vehicles and 
transmission equipment). The financial cost of the mission was partially supported by the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, Italy, Luxembourg and 
Spain.88 According to Nestor Djido, a spokesman for the ECOWAS: "For the first time, 
the international community and Africans have worked together effectively in the 
resolution of a conflict. We know Africa, but need their support."89  In Liberia the US 
played a useful role in supporting the 3600 West African peacekeepers by providing 
transportation and equipment through a civilian company.  
These programs provided an opportunity for West African countries to enhance 
the training of their forces on identical equipment and doctrine, both of which are critical 
for a multinational force deployed together in peacekeeping missions. Also, financial and 
logistical contribution of the international community had increased from previous 
interventions. Due to the efforts deployed by Western countries in training West African 
militaries, and the financial and logistical support provided from the international 
community, the performance increased, thus enabling African countries to conduct future 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions more efficiently. 
 
87 The European Union  and peacekeeping in Africa .Report of  the Assembly of Western European 
Union The Interparliamentary European Security and Defense Assembly of 1 December 2004,pp 26. 
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88 General Abdoulaye Khalilo Fall former Force Commander of ECOMOG in Côte d’Ivoire and later 
Force Commander United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), Côte d'Ivoire, 
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89 Nicole Itano Special to The Christian Science Monitor. Next door, lessons for Liberia; Western troops 
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E. REGIONAL POLITICAL RIVALRY AND ECOWAS PEACEMAKING 
1. Regional Political Rivalry  
The recrudescence of conflict anywhere in West Africa threatens regional 
security. The conflicts in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire have their roots in regional political 
and economic instability. The spillover effects of these conflicts in turn reached other 
neighboring countries, particularly Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea, where people had 
sought refuge.90  In these countries, refugees become potential recruits for insurgencies 
(which often plot against others, and had a destabilizing affect in this region). As a result, 
fighting factions in Liberia were supported by Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, while fighting 
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91 Map of refugees in West Africa < http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/SKAR-
64GC2E?OpenDocument -14k >( Mar 13, 2005).  
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Following the eruption of violence in Côte d’Ivoire, this country accused Liberia 
and Burkina Faso of colluding in an effort undermine its security by supporting rebel 
movement. According to the International Crisis Group, leaders of the main rebel group 
in Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI) planned the rebellion from their place of exile in Burkina Faso, 
and President Blaise Compaoré was aware of at least the outlines of their plans.92  Liberia 
was also directly involved in Côte d’Ivoire’s conflict by creating the two rebel 
movement, the MJP and the MPIGO, in retaliation for Côte d’Ivoire’s support of 
MODEL in Liberia. 
Although it may not be determinable whether or not Taylor and Blaise Compaoré  
were plotting together against Côte d’Ivoire, it is known that Compaore did have an 
interest in this country, namely over two million Burkinabe immigrants. With an 
escalation of conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, most of these immigrants will return home, 
thereby creating a destabilizing effect on Burkina Faso, already plagued with economic 
problems.  Moreover, Burkina Faso, as one the poorest country in this region, had little 
interest in destabilizing Côte d’Ivoire because its own economy was closely tied to Côte 
d’Ivoire. As a landlocked country, Burkina Faso depended heavily on Côted’Ivoire for 
the transport and export of its goods through roads and ports of the latter country.93   
Despite signs of a growing rivalry between the three countries, ongoing peace 
building in Liberia, together with the ongoing peace process in Côte d’Ivoire and the 
prominent role of ECOWAS in conciliating member states, may alleviate tensions. A 
reduction in friction between neighbors would then contribute to a relative consensus in 
this region.  In contrast to the earlier interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea 
Bissau, recent peacemaking efforts have been implemented in the framework of a 
political consensus upon main security issues.  The former political rivalry between the 
two main blocs, i.e., Francophone and Anglophone countries, seems to have been 
transformed into a regional consensus for building a stable and secure region. Most 
countries of this community now recognize the danger a lack of agreement presents to the 
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political stability of every country. Consequently, this amelioration of regional 
relationship and the rapprochement between the two blocs are contributing to the gradual 
elimination of rivalries and instability in this region. 
2. ECOWAS Peacemaking 
With the eruption of violence in Côte d’Ivoire in September 2002, ECOWAS, 
fearing possible spillover of violence across borders, became involved in mediation 
between the two parties in the conflict.94 At this time, ECOWAS took swift steps to 
search for a solution to the crisis. On September 29, 2002, ECOWAS convened an 
emergency summit meeting in Accra, which set up a Contact Group. This group was 
comprised of representatives from Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Togo, 
together with the African Union, formed to promote dialogue between the two parties in 
the conflict, and to discuss a general framework to resolve the crisis. 95  The mediation of 
the Contact Group led to a cease-fire, on October 17, 2002. Following this cease-fire, 
negotiations ensued in Lomé, Togo, where parties in the conflict reaffirmed their 
commitment to the cease-fire agreement and pledged to refrain from human rights 
abuses, while acknowledging the need to preserve the territorial integrity of Côte d'Ivoire 
and to respect the country's institutions.96  
Given the divergence of antagonist positions, ECOWAS failed to broker a peace 
plan amenable to all parties. Repeated violations of the cease-fire by both parties 
triggered the intervention of external mediators. New negotiations in France, with the 
help of ECOWAS, led to the Lina Marcoussis peace plan adopted by all parties on 
January 24, 2003.97 The Marcoussis Conference succeeded in addressing key issues of 
contention, including citizenship, land ownership and eligibility for the presidency.98 
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This peace plan included a power sharing agreement, in which the rebels were given 
important positions in a government of national reconciliation. Unfortunately, the 
implementation of the provisions of this peace plan has been problematic. Despite the 
diplomatic efforts of ECOWAS and French representatives to resolve the conflict, the 
belligerents continue to cling to their entrenched positions. 
ECOWAS also sponsored negotiations following the renewal of fighting in 
Liberia, in an effort to broker a peace plan. ECOWAS mediation in Liberia contributed to 
the formation of an International Contact Group for Liberia (IGCL), and the designation 
of General Abdusalami Abubakar, former military leader of Nigeria, to mediate the 
Liberia crisis.99  While political negotiations continued under the auspices of ECOWAS 
and the ICGL, fighting between rebels and the government intensified throughout the 
country, particularly around Monrovia, creating a critical humanitarian problem. 
According to aid agencies, over 100,000 people were living on the streets of the capital, 
seeking shelter and food supplies. Insecurity disrupted aid work in the capital, creating a 
situation where aid workers were unable to gain access to the majority of the Liberian 
territory.100 Due to this degradation of the humanitarian situation in Liberia, ECOWAS 
and ICGL urged the government of Liberia, LURD, and the MODEL to halt fighting in 
order to alleviate the suffering of a large segment of the Liberian population. They called 
all parties to the conflict to cooperate with the ECOWAS mediators in reaching a cease-
fire and brokering a peace process. After rounds of mediation, in Accra on June 17, 2003 
all parties were convinced to adhere to a cease-fire, and held to the hope of sponsoring a 
final political settlement of the conflict. 
Over a period of two months, intensive peace talks continued between the 
representatives of parties in the conflict and political parties. On August 18, 2003, a 
peace agreement had been reached in Accra between the government of Liberia, LURD, 
MODEL and political parties in the country. The agreement declared an immediate end to  
 
99 West Africa Network for Peace building: An Assessment of the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention and Good Governance, <http://www.wanep.org/programs/ 
image/ecowas_assessment_report.pdf> (8 February 2005). 
100ProQuest. Liberia: Ceasefire leads to peace 
hopes.<http://www.proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=26&sid=10&srchmode=1&vinst=PROD&fmt=3&s>
(8 February 2005).  
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the war, the resignation of Charles Taylor, and provided for the establishment of a 
National Transitional Government that would take over from the interim government 
headed by President Blah.101  
F. ECOMOG INTERVENTION IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE AND LIBERIA 
Following a new outbreak of violence in Côte d’Ivoire in September 2002, and a 
new cease-fire on October 17, 2002, ECOWAS proposed the deployment of a 
peacekeeping force in Côte d’Ivoire. On October 26, 2003, the Defense and Security 
Commission of ECOWAS submitted a proposal to the Mediation and Security Council to 
deploy 2386 peacekeepers, made up of troops from Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo, to monitor the ceasefire, while 
elaborating upon the mandate for the mission in Côte d’Ivoire. The two agencies adopted 
a clear mandate for ECOMOG, which stipulated the following: 
1. Monitoring the cessation of hostilities 
2. Facilitating the return of normal public administration services and 
the free movement of goods and services. 
3. Contributing to the implementation of peace agreement 
4. Guaranteeing the safety of the insurgents, observers, and 
humanitarian staff.102  
Unfortunately, contributing countries failed to generate the necessary forces to be 
deployed for this mission quickly enough because of financial and logistical constraints 
of member states. Due to the gravity of the situation, and the inability for ECOWAS to  
react quickly, French troops then present in the country deployed their forces along the 
cease-fire line. This arrangement was in the framework of a mutual agreement between 
warring factions in order to grant ECOWAS the needed time for it to generate its forces.  
Two months later, during a meeting in Dakar on December 18, ECOWAS leaders 
finally decided that ECOWAS’ Peace Force for Côte d'Ivoire (ECOFORCE) would be 
 
101 Peace Agreement Between The Government of Liberia (GOL), The Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), The Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and The 
Political Parties in Accra Ghana on August 18, 2003.<http://www.reliefweb.int/library/ 
documents/2003/gov-lib-18aug.pdf>,  (8 February 2005). 
102 Lansana Gberie and Prosper Addo.Challenges of Peace Implementation in Côte d’Ivoire 
<http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/No105/Contents.html>.(20 February 2005). 
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deployed by December 31, 2002. They also appointed General Papa Khalil Fall from 
Senegal to act as the Force Commander of ECOFORCE, and Raph Uwechue from 
Nigeria as the Special Representative of the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS for Côte 
d'Ivoire. The leaders appealed to the African Union and the UN to step up their 
involvement in assisting ECOWAS to resolve the Ivorian crisis.103 
Despite the will and the commitment of member states to deploy such forces to 
ensure the ceasefire, the dearth of domestic financial and logistical resources prevented 
the generation and deployment of forces in a timely manner. ECOWAS called on the 
international community to respond to the needs of peacekeeping forces in Côte d’Ivoire 
by lending it their support. ECOWAS began deploying its first forces from Senegal and 
Ghana in January 2003. Later Benin, Niger and Togo committed troops to form the 
ECOMOG force in Côte d’Ivoire. In order not to compromise the neutrality of 
ECOMOG, Mali did not commit the forces pledged because of the presence of many 
Malian immigrants in Côte d’Ivoire.  
Because of financial and logistical shortcomings, it took ECOWAS two months to 
deploy peacekeepers, while it took the French only a few days to prepared to secure the 
cease-fire. Moreover, once ECOMOG forces arrived in Côte d’Ivoire, it took them two 
more months to become fully operational because of lack of adequate equipment and 
vehicles.  
The Force Commander had to use his own initiative, his own knowledge 
of the country, and his own acquaintances to get things moving. Even so, 
it took more than 100 days to set up a basic force headquarters, When the 
main body of Detachment SOUTH deployed in Abidjan in March 2003, it 
had no vehicles and no place to work. It is mainly through the assistance 
of the French, the Government of Côte d’Ivoire, and through personal 
contacts of the Force Commander and the efforts of the Chair of the 
Defense and Security Commission (Lt Gen Obeng of Ghana) that this 




103 United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire Côte d'Ivoire – 
MINUCI.<[http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/home.shtml>. (5 February 2005)
104Lansana Gberie and Prosper Addo.Challenges of Peace Implementation in Côte d’Ivoire 
<http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/No105/Contents.html>.( 20 February 2005) 
 Figure 2. Map of Cote d’Ivoire Showing the Deployment of ECOMOG 
Forces Along the Line of Cease Fire105 
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105 Map of Map of Cote d’Ivoire showing the deployment of ECOMOG forces along the line of cease 
fire <htpp://www.unorg/Docs/sc/sgrep03.html.66> (14 March 2005). 
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It is important to note that ECOMOG’s deployment was made possible only by 
massive support by the international community. French troops provided transport, 
uniform, and food, while he US provides communication equipments and vehicles (now 
these vehicles patrol Abidjan’s “zone of confidence” through the center of the 
country).106  Once the first 1264 peacekeepers were deployed on the ground and took 
over the mission from the French, they faced many challenges in ensuring that the cease-
fire held. Not only the peacekeepers were fewer in number, to face the increase of 
violence following the proliferation of other groups in the West of the country, but they 
also lacked funds and logistics. Despite the international community’s support, problems 
persisted. For that reason, “in March 2003, the ECOWAS Defense and Security 
Commission recommended an increase in the size of ECOFORCE from 1264 troops to 
3411” to secure the cease-fire and prevent the further deterioration of security situation. 
107 
During the deployment of ECOFORCE in Côte d’Ivoire, peacekeepers from 
contributing countries had efficiently implemented the mission assigned to them. In May 
2003, ECOFORCE was deployed in a joint operation with the French, Forces Armees 
Nationale de Cote d’Ivoire (FANCI) and the Forces Nouvelles. This operation aimed at 
securing the West by imposing the cease-fire and creating a demilitarized zone. Over the 
period of this operation, ECOFORCE performed well.108 The organizational problems 
witnessed in the past did not surface during this intervention. Improved training and 
organization contributed to the amelioration of difficulties at the operational level. 
Despite the delay of deployment and other logistical shortcomings, ECOMOG, with the 
support of international community, contributed effectively to halting the fighting and 
assisting in the stabilization of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire. According to the Force 
Commander, ECOMOG enjoyed significant achievements in Côte d’Ivoire, along with 
 
106 Nicole Itano Speacial to the Christian Science Monitor.Boston  
< http://wwww.proquest.umi.com,>( 20 February 2005). 
107 Report of the Security Council mission to West Africa ,26 june-5 July2003. 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/home.shtml (8 February 2005).
108 International Crisis Group report on 28 November 2004 :Cote d’Ivoire the war is not yet over  
<http;//www.crisis9.web.org/home/index.cfm?id=238981=1>. (14 February 2005). 
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French forces. Over the period of its first operational duty from March 29, 2003 to its 
merger into the United Nations' operation on April 4, 2004, its achievements included: 
1. A shift away from the monitoring of the cease-fire line, to the 
control of the zone of confidence, casting away further the specter 
of direct confrontations;  
2. The restoration of the broken dialogue between the belligerents 
parties (e.g., war prisoners were released, and a joint D.D.R 
implementation plan was developed) 
3. Trade and humanitarian corridors were opened;  
4. The impartial forces' operations were expanded throughout the 
territory in the aim of restoring confidence and assisting the 
regrouping of combatants;  
5. An important civil-military activities program was implemented, 
including a priority fold in free medical assistance to the 
populations,109  
Although the peacekeepers efficiently monitored the cease-fire and demonstrated 
their capabilities in dealing with complex situation in Côte d’Ivoire, the Force 
Commander added that ECOMOG still suffered from some inherent weaknesses, despite 
the commitment of the international community to build ECOWAS’ capabilities. Its 
slowness in the mobilization of troops, its lack of adequate equipment, its poor logistical 
support facilities and its modest funding continued to constitute the main shortcomings of 
ECOMOG in Côte d’Ivoire.110 
For these reasons, ECOWAS continued to call upon the UN Security Council, 
over the period of intervention to establish a UN force to take over from ECOFORCE in 
Côte d’Ivoire. According to General Sheikh Diarra, Deputy Executive Secretary of 
ECOWAS in charge of Defense and Security Commission, “the request was determined  
 
109 Declaration of General Abdoulaye Khalil Fall former Force Commander of ECOMOG in Côte 
d'Ivoire and latter Force Commander  of United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), Côte 
d'Ivoire.<http://www.mandela.inwent.org/ef/military/fall.htm>. (15 February 2005). 
110 Ibid. 
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by a dearth of necessary funding to maintain ECOMICI (ECOWAS Mission in Côte 
d’Ivoire) in the country until 2005, when new elections are scheduled, as well as a 
requirement for a significantly wider troop’s deployment to the country.”111 
In comparison with past interventions, ECOMOG had improved, in terms of 
organization and operational performance. However, the ECOMOG intervention in Côte 
d’Ivoire shows that financial and logistical constraints, despite the aid of many donors, 
continue to undermine its effectiveness. The international community’s financial 
contribution was still not enough to cover the substantial needs of ECOMOG. The 
domestic financial and logistical shortage of its contributing countries prevented it from 
earmarking forces for ECOMOG at the right moment. The combination of those factors 
contributed to the delay in the generation and deployment of forces. It became apparent 
that, in the absence of a reliable and centralized funding and logistical structure managed 
by ECOWAS; these kinds of problems would continue to hinder the efficiency of 
ECOMOG as regional peacekeeping body. 
Subsequently, following the cease-fire between the government of Liberia, 
LURD, and MODEL, ECOMOG intervened, following the cease-fire signed on June 17, 
2003. ECOWAS agreed to deploy about 3000 peacekeepers in Liberia for the second 
time, provided that it got the financial and logistical support from the UN and the 
international community it needed. Conscious of challenges faced during the generation 
and deployment of ECOMOG in Côte d’Ivoire, ECOWAS, after obtaining the consent of 
the UN, opted for the deployment of only part of its forces, troops already deployed in 
Sierra Leone, pending the contributing countries of ECOWAS to activate the necessary 
forces. 
Drawing on the past experiences in this country, and in order to prevent past 
shortcomings as they related to the mandate given to ECOMOG, ECOWAS defined 




111 Segun Adeyemi,Janes Defense Weekly Correspondent Lagos. ECOWAS seeks UN peace force in 
Cote d’Ivoire.<http://www.4.Janes.com/k2/docprint.jsp ?K2DocKey,>(20 January2005) 
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1. Facilitating and monitoring the disengagement of forces 
2. Obtaining data and information on activities relating to military 
forces of the parties to the Ceasefire Agreement and coordinating 
all military movements 
3. Establishing conditions for the initial stages of Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) activities 
4. Ensuring respect by the Parties for the definitive cessation of 
hostilities and all other aspects of the Ceasefire Agreement 
5. Ensuring the security of senior political and military leaders 
6. Ensuring the security of all personnel and experts involved in the 
implementation of this Agreement in collaboration with all parties 
7. Monitoring the storage of arms, munitions and equipment, 
including supervising the collection, storage and custody of 
battlefield or offensive armament in the hands of combatants.112 
In contrast to previous intervention in Liberia, all parties in the conflict accepted 
the deployment of ECOMOG as interposition forces. ECOMOG did not meet any 
opposition from the parties in the conflict.  They called on ECOMOG to secure the cease-
fire, create a zone of separation between the belligerent forces and, thus provide a save 
corridor for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and free movement of persons.113 
The peacekeepers began to be deployed in Liberia under the command of the 
Nigerian Brigadier, General Festus Okonkwo, as Force Commander of ECOWAS 
Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). The Nigerians were the first to be deployed, transferred 
from the UN forces deployed in Sierra Leone. “On 4 August 2003, the first Nigerian 
commandos arrived aboard United Nations helicopters.”114 They were assisted by US 
troops deployed from American war ships especially for this mission who provided 
logistical support to ECOMOG forces. Once it was completely established, this body was 
                                                 
112 Peace Agreement Between The Government of Liberia (GOL), The Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), The Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and The 
Political Parties in Accra Ghana on August 18, 2003. 
<http://www.reliefweb.int/library/ documents/2003/gov-lib-18aug.pdf> (8 February 2005). 
113 Ibid 
114 Tim Werner.New York Times. New York, N.Y August 15, 2003.  
<http://www.proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=50&sid=4&srchmode=1&uinst=PROD&fmt=3&st>.(8 February 2005). 
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comprised of troops from Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal 
and Togo. The first ECOMOG peacekeepers deployed in Liberia contributed to the 
securing of the capital and participated in the hand over of power from Taylor to his vice 
president.  ECOMOG’s mission in Liberia stretched from August 4, 2004 to October 1, 
2004 and contributed efficiently to the stabilization of situation in this country. During 
the short period of its deployment, ECOMOG efficiently contributed to ensure the 
security of returning Internal Displaced Persons. In this field, ECOMOG forces also 
worked closely with international organizations and NGOs to improve the security 
situation throughout the country, thereby enhancing the work of humanitarian 
organizations in their assistance for the suffering populations in Liberia.115 Many 
observers and government officials averred that ECOMOG forces had contributed to the 
stabilization of this country after many years of intermittent civil wars. In this context, the 
US Ambassador to Liberia (in Monrovia) presented the Embassy’s official certificate of 
appreciation to all ECOMOG contingents for their outstanding service during their 
deployment in Liberia. The same official, during a ceremony of departure of some 
contingents at the end their deployment stated: 
While it is true that the United States Marines did deploy in Liberia, that 
our Joint Task Force did provide several other forms of support as well, 
ECOMIL was the main body in accomplishing those peacekeeping 
objectives, showing distinction and bravery throughout in the face of 
danger and uncertainty. ECOMIL deserves enormous credit. In essence, 
they played an essential role in stopping a war and ending much human 
suffering.116 
During this period, ECOMOG’s image improved dramatically vis à vis its 
treatment of the Liberian population.  Peacekeepers showed their professionalism and 
uprightness toward civilian populations who had suffered from actions and abuses during 
the last intervention. Despite these achievements on the ground, the challenges that 
 
115 US. Agency for International Development. Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance 
(DCHA).Office of US of Foreign Disaster Assistance. Liberia-Complex Emergency Situation Report 11 of September 
17,2003<[http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/fy2003_index.html.> 
(15 February 2005). 
116 Speech of John.W. Blaney, Ambassador of the US in Monrovia during a ceremony of departure of ECOMOG 
contingents after the end of their mission in Liberia. <http://www.monrovia.usembassy.gov/Liberia/feb272004.html>, 
(15 February 2005). 
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plagued the operation in Côte d’Ivoire resurfaced in Liberia. Fortunately, this mission 
lasted only one month before the UN took over. 
Aware of the logistical and financial constraints witnessed in the Côte d’Ivoire 
mission, ECOWAS appealed to the international community for help to sustain 
ECOMOG’s deployment in Liberia. Despite these precautions, logistical problems once 
again threatened the implementation of the mission. According to a US observer on the 
ground:  
As humanitarian crisis abated, ECOMIL’s logistical situation grew 
tenuous. Deployment delays, equipment shortages and shortfalls in basic 
quality life were combining to threaten ECOMIL’s ability to create a 
secure environment for humanitarian organization to operate outside 
Monrovia. To improve coordination and situational awareness, the Joint 
Task Force (JTF) Commander directed a South European Task Force 
(SETAF) officer to serve as a liaison directly to the US Department of 
State in Washington, DC working directly with state and Pacific 
Architects and Engineering (PA&E) officials, this logistical advisor 
helped develop a viable support plan to sustain the ECOMIL force through 
the arrival of the UN follow-on force.117 
As in the Côte d’Ivoire intervention, ECOMOG continued to rely on external 
financial and logistical support. Since ECOWAS did not establish its own financial and 
logistical capabilities to fund the Special Emergency Fund, ECOMOG could not fulfill its 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions efficiently. The international community 
cannot be expected to contribute enough to respond to the needs of a sub-regional 
organization, such as ECOMOG. This has been established during both past and recent 
interventions, where contributions from the international community in supporting and 
equipping ECOMOG’s force have been far below the requirements. For example, the UN 
faced many challenges to re-hat the 3500 ECOMOG peacekeepers in Liberia because  
 





                                                
they were not sufficiently equipped and fell below the UN operational and logistical 
requirement, this because the troops were inadequately equipped by a private American 
contractor, Pacific Architects and Engineers.118 
Nevertheless, it is clear that ECOWAS has achieved much in term of its 
organization and capabilities to deploy well-trained peacekeepers. In previous 
interventions ECOMOG was characterized by a lack of professionalism, while in current 
intervention peacekeepers had demonstrated their skill and knowledge in dealing with 
peacekeeping operations. Improvement at the operational level of forces, due mainly to 
previous training in a common doctrine and with identical equipment, is also apparent. In 
this context, the international initiatives in building these capabilities have proven 
successful. Cohesion and cooperation between different contingents on the ground has 
also increased. Equitable representation of forces from different countries in ECOMOG 
had been achieved during these interventions, preventing past shortcomings related to the 
dominance of one country. The only handicap that persists is that ECOWAS has proven 
to be unable to respond to needs of its forces in term of financial and logistical resources. 
Despite the remarkable realizations in term of organization and training of peacekeeping 
forces, funding issues remain the Achilles heel of ECOMOG.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The perception of peacemaking and peacekeeping operations has changed 
substantially over the last two decades. The end of the Cold War contributed to the end of 
rivalries between the US and USSR regarding security issues, at the same time triggering 
the appearance of new actors at the regional level in dealing with regional security 
matters. In Africa, ECOWAS, over the course of the last fifteen years has evolved from 
being purely an economic entity to embracing a desire to secure regional peace and 
stability. For this reason, ECOWAS and ECOMOG represent an ambitious regional 
initiative in face of the recrudescence of violence and regional instability in West African 
conflicts. The interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire 
have secured a place for ECOWAS/ECOMOG among the organizations dealing with the 
preservation of international peace and security. The most successful element of the 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG in coping with West African conflicts is the achievement of 
settlements to conflicts and the reduction of violence in those countries. This organization 
has undergone significant transformation to meet the challenges presented by security 
matters and regional political developments. The transition from operating in merely an 
ad hoc manner when coping with regional conflict, into one having a more standing 
framework to manage those crises, has often demonstrated the ability of this organization 
to consolidate its institutions. Despite the lack of means and experience in this field, 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG was always determined to respond to regional armed conflicts, to 
ensure regional stability. Aware of the prominent role of regional stability, ECOWAS 
aimed at ensuring a security environment that was suitable for economic development 
and social progress. 
In the area of peacekeeping and peacemaking, ECOWSA/ECOMOG has been 
involved in this region in two phases. In the 1990’s, ECOWAS/ECOMOG first 
intervened in Liberia, and subsequently in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, to mediate 
violent civil wars and reduce violence and the suffering of civilian populations in affected 
countries. In the second phase, ECOWAS/ECOMOG intervened to bring peace again in 
Liberia, and to stabilize the security situation in Côte d’Ivoire. The first three 
interventions turned out to be much more difficult than the last two. During the first 
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interventions, ECOMOG lacked the necessary organizational structure and experience to 
deal with peacekeeping operations in highly unstable regions. Moreover, the lack of 
financial and logistical means on one hand, combined with the deficiencies of the support 
of the international community on the other, complicated most of ECOWAS/ECOMOG 
tasks. Despite these difficulties, ECOWAS/ECOMOG has made great accomplishments 
during its interventions. 
The most notable achievements of ECOWAS in West Africa are, first, its 
evolution from being merely focused on regional economic development and integration 
to being an important actor in dealing with security issues at the regional level. Second, 
fifteen years of suffering casualties from financial and logistical problems and yet 
sustaining the deployment of its forces has demonstrated its commitment to the peace 
process. Third, it has demonstrated an ability to put end to conflict and to prevent the 
escalation of conflicts to inter-state confrontations that would destabilize all regions. 
Finally, after many years of political dissension and regional rivalry upon false problems, 
ECOWAS has demonstrated an ability to achieve a regional consensus upon security 
issues.  
From the beginning of its deployment in Liberia in 1990, ECOMOG and 
ECOWAS were engaged in ensuring security and order in this country and searching for 
a peaceful resolution to civil war. Over the period of the intervention, ECOMOG 
participated in the protection of civilian populations to alleviate their suffering. Also, they 
joined with others in their efforts to broker numerous peace plans, urging fighting 
factions to comply with the provisions of peace agreements. ECOWAS/ECOMOG 
convened peace talks among the fighting parties in Liberia, which, after seven years of 
fighting, culminated with the peaceful resolution of the protracted conflict. Following this 
peace agreement, ECOWAS/ECOMOG actively contributed to monitoring the cease-fire, 
disarmament, and demobilization of combatants. With the cooperation of the UN, 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG helped to implement a peace process, particularly the preparation 
and supervision of elections in Liberia. 
In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG succeed in reinstating the constitutional order and 
legality by restoring the elected president to power and evicting rebels from the capital. 
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This action was a first step by ECOWAS, aimed at deterring other insurgents from 
altering the democratic path in this region, and to halting the phenomena of coup d’etat.  
Through its peace enforcement actions, it also contributed significantly to the reduction 
of atrocities committed by rebels against innocent populations. Acting in parallel with its 
military actions, ECOWAS showed its commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflict 
by sponsoring many peace talks. After the involvement of the UN, ECOMOG contributed 
to stabilizing and training the new Sierra Leonean military. 
In Guinea Bissau, despite the mixed results of this intervention, 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG succeeded in separating the belligerents, monitoring a cease-fire, 
and prompting foreign forces to leave the country and respect its sovereignty.  
Those interventions were, at the time, an improvised response to conflicts in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, in the absence of a necessary structure to deal 
with such crises. As a result, ECOWAS/ECOMOG faced numerous obstacles and 
difficulties in carrying out its mission.  The regional political division and organizational, 
financial and logistical challenges were amongst the most intractable shortcomings and 
weaknesses of ECOWAS during this period.  
Regional political divisions were among the more serious problems that ECOWAS faced 
during its attempt to resolve the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Many West 
African countries opposed ECOWAS military options against the fighting parties and, 
instead supported these countries in fighting ECOMOG. This lack of regional consensus 
upon security issues and the rivalries between the Francophone and Anglophone 
countries negatively influenced the role of ECOWAS and ECOMOG in their 
peacemaking and peacekeeping missions. ECOWAS’ ad hoc manner of responding to 
regional conflicts in West Africa was a source of organizational problems. In the absence 
of an institutional organization and standing security framework, ECOWAS/ECOMOG 
improvised all their actions in dealing with those conflicts, in term of organization and 
deployment of forces and decision-making. In past interventions, ECOWAS was unable 
to sustain the high cost of military operations. Since the beginning, ECOWAS relied on  
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voluntary contributions of its member states in covering the costs of the military 
intervention. Unfortunately, their limited resources left them unable to respond, even to 
the urgent needs of their own forces. 
During the second interventions, ECOMOG demonstrated that it had learned 
some lessons from the past mistakes. ECOWAS had developed a regional mechanism 
and structure aimed at preventing ad hoc responses and maintaining ways of negotiations, 
while creating an environment through which member states could resolve their internal 
problems. It introduced an important change by creating a standing structure to overcome 
the regional political division with regard to security issues. ECOWAS, with the 
cooperation of the international community, played an important role in achieving some 
breakthroughs in peacemaking in Liberia. In Côte d’Ivoire, ECOWAS became 
increasingly involved in mediation between the parties to the conflict since the outbreak 
of violence. Its efforts were successful to convince the two sides to adhere to a cease-fire 
pending a political solution to the conflict.  
In Côte d’Ivoire, ECOMOG was deployed to monitor the cease-fire. Despite its 
delay in the generation of forces for the operation, it has efficiently contributed the 
stabilization of this country by separating the belligerents and halting the fighting.  
ECOMOG was deployed in Liberia as a vanguard force from August 4, 2004 to October 
1, 2004, the time it took to transfer authority to the United Nations Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL). The first ECOMOG peacekeepers were drawn from the UN Mission in Sierra 
Leone and used by the UN resources for their initial deployment in Liberia. During this 
period, ECOMOG had contributed efficiently to the stabilization of key areas in this 
country. It had secured the ceasefire between the fighting parties, assisted to the hand 
over of power by Charles Taylor and contributed in ensuring a secure environment for the 
transit and delivery of humanitarian assistance in a devastated country.  
During these interventions, ECOWAS/ECOMOG overcame most of structural 
and organizational shortcomings witnessed during the first interventions. However, the 
financial and logistical problems persisted. ECOWAS remains unable to respond to the 
needs of its forces in term of financial and logistical resources. In Côte d’Ivoire, the 
problem of generation of forces and the delay of their deployment were caused mainly by 
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the lack of financial and logistical resources. ECOWAS relied heavily on external 
assistance and support to deploy its forces in this country. The same handicap was 
witnessed in Liberia where, without logistical support from the US, ECOMOG could not 
have completed its assigned mission efficiently. 
Over the last fifteen years, ECOWAS had steadily evolved, through the two 
phases of interventions, to respond to regional crises more efficiently. The role of 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG in peacemaking and peacekeeping at the regional level dictated its 
sharing some responsibilities with the UN. However, ECOWAS/ECOMOG is still facing 
intractable financial and logistical problems to sustain its peacekeeping missions. 
Drawing upon the experience of past interventions, ECOWAS has been unable to sustain 
ECOMOG financially and logistically for more than one month at a time. For this reason, 
the financial and logistical support and expertise of the UN and the international 
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